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Faultless Guilt: Toward a Relationship-Based Account of Criminal Liability
Abstract
There is in the criminal law perhaps no principle more canonical than the fault principle, which holds that
one may be punished only where one is blameworthy, and one is blameworthy only where one is at fault.
Courts, criminal law scholars, moral philosophers, and textbook authors all take the fault principle to be
the foundational requirement for a just criminal law. Indeed, perceived threats to the fault principle in the
midtwentieth century yielded no less an achievement than the drafting of the Model Penal Code, which
had as its guiding purpose an effort to safeguard faultless conduct from criminal condemnation.
Yet notwithstanding its pedigree and predominance, I believe that the fault principle is false: Fault is not in
fact necessary for one to deserve blame and punishment. Instead, and as made plain by the broader
account of guilt I shall articulate here, one can be blameworthy, and so deserve punishment, even if one
committed no element of the crime, and merely because one bears a particular kind of relationship to the
criminal. Just when and why relationships, rather than fault, ought to ground criminal liability is what I
seek to elucidate here.
To that end, the Article first interrogates the (very few) arguments made on behalf of the fault principle
and finds these wanting. The Article then presents cases and examples that illustrate how it is that one
could be blameworthy even though one is not at fault. Finally, the Article considers the criminal law
implications for individuals who are blameworthy without fault, and it concludes that at least some of
these individuals deserve prosecution and punishment.
This conclusion should not only shift our thinking about the conceptual relationships between blame,
fault, guilt, culpability, and criminal liability. It should also awaken us to salutary practical possibilities. For
the Article’s account, we shall see, ultimately provides a way to prosecute individuals who are widely
regarded as deserving criminal punishment (e.g., executives at banks responsible for the financial crisis)
but whom the fault principle currently places outside of the criminal law’s reach.
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FAULTLESS GUILT: TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP-BASED
ACCOUNT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Amy J. Sepinwall*
ABSTRACT
There is in the criminal law perhaps no principle more canonical than
the fault principle, which holds that one may be punished only where one
is blameworthy, and one is blameworthy only where one is at fault.
Courts, criminal law scholars, moral philosophers, and textbook authors
all take the fault principle to be the foundational requirement for a just
criminal law. Indeed, perceived threats to the fault principle in the midtwentieth century yielded no less an achievement than the drafting of the
Model Penal Code, which had as its guiding purpose an effort to
safeguard faultless conduct from criminal condemnation.
Yet notwithstanding its pedigree and predominance, I believe that the
fault principle is false: Fault is not in fact necessary for one to deserve
blame and punishment. Instead, and as made plain by the broader
account of guilt I shall articulate here, one can be blameworthy, and so
deserve punishment, even if one committed no element of the crime, and
merely because one bears a particular kind of relationship to the
criminal. Just when and why relationships, rather than fault, ought to
ground criminal liability is what I seek to elucidate here.
To that end, the Article first interrogates the (very few) arguments
made on behalf of the fault principle and finds these wanting. The
Article then presents cases and examples that illustrate how it is that one
could be blameworthy even though one is not at fault. Finally, the Article
considers the criminal law implications for individuals who are
blameworthy without fault, and it concludes that at least some of these
individuals deserve prosecution and punishment.
This conclusion should not only shift our thinking about the
conceptual relationships between blame, fault, guilt, culpability, and
criminal liability. It should also awaken us to salutary practical
possibilities. For the Article’s account, we shall see, ultimately provides
a way to prosecute individuals who are widely regarded as deserving
criminal punishment (e.g., executives at banks responsible for the
financial crisis) but whom the fault principle currently places outside of
the criminal law’s reach.

*

James G. Campbell, Jr. Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., McGill University, 1997; M.A.,
McGill University, 1999; J.D., Yale Law School, 2004; Ph.D., Philosophy, Georgetown

[Note to reader: The Article’s positive account begins in Part IV.
Readers pressed for time might read the Introduction and then skip the
arguments and preliminaries set forth in Parts I-III.]

INTRODUCTION
A. The False Fault Principle
Among the orthodoxies pervading criminal law doctrine and theory
perhaps none is so well entrenched as the fault principle, which holds
that one may be punished only where one is blameworthy,1 and one is
blameworthy only where one is at fault.2 Courts have deemed the fault
1

See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Just Punishment in an Imperfect World, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1263, 1265 (1989) (reviewing DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY:
JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW (1988) and attributing to Bazelon the view that, in
“mainstream academic thinking: “‘Our collective conscience does not allow
punishment where it cannot impose blame.’” (quoting BAZELON, supra note 1, at 8)).
2
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Methaphysics of Causation and Results, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 879, 879 (2000) (“[V]irtually all criminal law theorists agree that moral
fault is at least a necessary condition of blame and punishment . . . .”); Schulhofer,
supra note 1, at 1265 (citing Bazelon for the claim that “blame attaches only when the
defendant can be found at fault according to prevailing community standards”); James
J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That
Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1448 (1994) (“Modern
scholarly and judicial thought considers fault for every element of an offense to be an
essential predicate for blame, responsibility, and punishment.”); cf. Sanford H. Kadish,
Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 264 (1985) (“[C]riminal conviction charges a
moral fault . . . .”); Antony Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (May 14, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/ (attributing to
H.L.A. Hart the view that “those who lack fault should not be liable to criminal
punishment”).
The locus of fault in the criminal law has traditionally been in the mens rea or
mental state requirement. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *20–22 (“[T]o constitute a crime against human laws, there must
be, first, a vitious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vitious
will.”); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW (John M. Zane & Carl
Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1923) § 287 (“[T]here can be no crime, large or small, without an
evil mind”); Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV.
L. REV. 75, 81 (1908) (“It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law, for which no
authorities need be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall not be punished unless he
has a criminal mind.”); Williamson v. Norris [1898] 1 QB 7 [14] (Lord Russell, CJ)
(UK) (“The general rule of English law is, that no crime can be committed unless there
is mens rea.”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (“‘It is alike the
general rule of law, and the dictate of natural justice that to constitute guilt there must
be not only a wrongful act, but a criminal intention.’” (quoting People v. Flack, 26 N.E.
267, 270 (N.Y. 1891))); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and
Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 859, 860 (1999) (“This concern with whether the conduct of the defendant

principle the foundational principle in criminal law,3 and it is a standard
fixture in criminal law textbooks and scholarship.4 Much moral theory
manifested an evil mind reflects a basic and fundamental principle of justice: Only the
blameworthy (guilty), and not the blameless (innocent), should be punished.”).
3
Prosecutor v. Tadíc, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 186, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286
(1943) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence that guilt is personal and that it ought not lightly to be imputed to a
citizen who . . . has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing.”). But cf. Peter
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1513 n.2 (1992) (“The
United States Constitution generally does not require the legislature to incorporate
moral culpability principles into its definitions of crimes.”). See generally Richard H.S.
Tur, Justifications of Reverse Discrimination, in LAW, MORALITY AND RIGHTS 259, 274
(M.A. Stewart ed., 1983) (“[T]he ‘fault principle’ is the basis . . . of the criminal law of
at least the western world.”); James G. Stewart, The Accomplice Liability of Arms
Vendors 18 & n.42 (July 11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“If
there is anything approaching universal agreement in criminal theory, it might be that
only the guilty should be punished.”). By way of evidence, Arenella goes on to cite
strict liability crimes. Arenella, supra note 3, at 1513 n.2. I distinguish strict liability
crimes from the ground of criminal liability. See infra text accompanying notes 20–21.
At any rate, even Arenella recognizes that the “criminal law does, however, tie legal to
moral blame for serious mala in se crimes punishable by prolonged confinement or
death.” Id. at 1513 (footnote omitted).
4
For textbook articulations of the fault principle, see, for example, WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 100 (1978);
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 325–59 (2d ed. 1960)
(claiming that faultless criminal liability is incompatible with any civilized, rational,
and moral system of penal law).
For criminal law scholarship insisting upon the fault principle, see, for example,
Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109
(arguing vigorously against strict liability crimes); cf. Singer & Husak, supra note 2
(reviewing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and finding an almost unwavering
commitment to a mens rea requirement, which the authors endorse). Other theorists
acknowledge, but decry, departures from the fault principle. See, e.g., Phillip E.
Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973);
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985) (objecting to treating
accomplices as no less culpable than principals even when the accomplice makes no
causal contribution to the offense); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning
Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1772 (2005) (objecting to
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise because it ensnares innocents along with the
guilty); Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 619, 633
(2007) (railing against the practice of holding commanders responsible for a crime of
their subordinates on the ground that “no one, in fact, can be punished for a wrongful
act unless the act is attributable to him”).
One can find the occasional defense of the few criminal law doctrines that depart
from the fault principle, but these defenses tend to proceed on deterrence or prudential
grounds, and not on grounds of desert. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 658 (1984) (noting situations like strict criminal liability
and Pinkerton liability “in which furtherance of the utilitarian goal of deterrence

embraces the fault principle as well.5 So sacrosanct is the fault principle
that apparent threats to it prompted the drafting of the Model Penal
Code, whose guiding purpose was to “safeguard conduct that is without
fault from condemnation as criminal.”6 Recent efforts at federal criminal
law reform also aim to buttress the fault principle. These have garnered
support from both Houses,7 and both sides of the political aisle,8 on the
unifying thought that, as Gideon Yaffe puts it in his own endorsement of
the bills, “[n]o one should be convicted of a crime . . . without evidence
of a criminal state of mind.”9
Notwithstanding the fault principle’s pedigree and predominance,
however, this article contends that the fault principle is false. Now, there
is one sense in which this contention is trivially true: our criminal law
includes strict liability crimes.10 The getaway driver for a bank robbery
disregards principles of culpability”); cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112
YALE L.J. 1307 (2003) (advancing a prudential theory to defend Pinkerton liability).
But see Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
965 (2008) (offering a retributive defense of felony-murder).
Further, even those who advance an economic analysis of the criminal law
nonetheless recognize the connection between fault and wrong. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 973 (2001) (“[I]t
is, after all, wrongs that give rise to the need for retribution . . . .”). Finally, strict
liability—or liability without fault—has been decried in the civil context, too. See, e.g.,
Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 821 & n.4
(1992) (arguing that most of the key assumptions of strict liability should be rejected).
5
See, e.g., Susan Wolf, The Moral of Moral Luck, 31 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 5, 16
(2001) (arguing blameworthiness to be solely a function of faultiness); cf. Miranda
Fricker, What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation, 50 NOÛS 165, 170
(2016) (“[A] minimal definition of blame [would] essentially incorporat[e] a kind of
judgment: a finding fault with someone for their (inward or outward) conduct.”). See
generally Arenella, supra note 3, at 1518–20 (listing conditions that must be satisfied
before an individual deserves moral blame for conduct).
6
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also Alan C. Michaels,
Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 831–32 (1999) (describing the
Model Penal Code’s attitude here as a “‘frontal assault’ on strict liability, [and so]
requiring culpability for all crimes in the Code”). See generally Paul H. Robinson &
Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007) (discussing the history, influence, and innovations of the
Model Penal Code).
7
See Mens Rea Reform Act of 2015, S. 2298, 114th Cong. (2015); Criminal Code
Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Cong. (2015).
8
See, e.g., Russell Berman, Can the Senate Reform Criminal Justice?, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/will-criminal-justiceactually-be-reformed/408538/ (“[T]he introduction of Senate legislation . . . has the
backing of key leaders in both parties.”).
9
Gideon Yaffe, A Republican Crime Proposal That Democrats Should Back, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/opinion/a-republicancrime-proposal-that-democrats-should-back.html. But see Rena Steinzor, Dangerous
Bedfellows, AM. PROSPECT (May 11, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/dangerousbedfellows.
10
For prominent texts describing and critiquing strict criminal liability, see, for

can be convicted of murder if one of his co-felons accidentally fires his
gun and kills in the course of the robbery.11 A man can be convicted of
mail fraud, even if he was in prison at the time the fraud occurred, so
long as it was part of an ongoing conspiracy in which he is involved.12 A
CEO can be convicted of a rodent infestation at one of the company
warehouses even if he has taken all reasonable measures to address the
infestation.13 So it is obvious that the fault principle, at least as a positive
claim, is mistaken: contrary to the fault principle, one can be criminally
liable even if one is not at fault. Moreover, the strict liability these cases
evidence is no new feature of the modern regulatory state; instead, it is a
fixture of the Ancients’ responsibility practice.14 The problem is that the
fault principle has come to so dominate our conception of responsibility
that we have lost sight of the rationale for this more expansive
responsibility practice.
This Article aims to unseat the fault principle as the exclusive source
of guilt and to recover the rationale for non-fault-based liability to blame.
Contrary to the fault principle, one can be blameworthy even if one is not
at fault. Further, one can sometimes deserve prosecution and punishment
because one is blameworthy, even though one is not at fault.
On the account to be advanced here, it is relationships, rather than
fault, that ground blame.15 Thus, for example, a parent should sometimes

example, Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 731 (1960); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise and Fall
of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
11
See, e.g., The California Felony-Murder Rule, Shouse Cal. L. Group,
http://www.shouselaw.com/felony-murder.html (last visited July 11, 2016).
12
See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–47 (1946).
13
See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673–74 (1975).
14
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 147–49
(2010) (discussing examples of strict liability from ancient Greece, the Bible, and
Japanese culture); cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT
IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 181–87, 205 (2002) (commenting on ancient notions of
pollution, or guilt by association, which are forms of strict liability).
15
A handful of other scholars have offered non-fault based accounts of guilt. See, e.g.,
Herbert Morris, Nonmoral Guilt, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS:
NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 220, 237–40 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)
(describing vicarious guilt); KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 65 (E.B.
Ashton trans., 2001) (describing “metaphysical guilt”); Scott A. Anderson,
Rationalizing Indirect Guilt, 33 VT. L. REV. 519, 521 (2009) (describing survivor guilt).
These accounts differ from the one here, however, in part because they do not depend
on family or family-like relationships and, more significantly still, because whether one
experiences the emotion these authors describe is entirely at one’s discretion. See Amy
J. Sepinwall, Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming Americans for
War Crimes in Iraq, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 231 (Tracy
Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011). By contrast, faultless guilt, as I conceive of it, is
normative: it is the emotion one ought to experience in light of one’s relationship to the
wrong or the wrongdoer.

be blamed for the wrongs of her child,16, even if she is not culpable for
these wrongs and even if she has parented well.17 Furthermore, a
corporate executive should sometimes be blamed and perhaps even
punished for the crimes of his corporation, even if he did not participate
in these crimes, and even if he too could not have prevented them.18
Further, the reasons justifying blame and punishment in these
relationship-based cases are not—or not purely—instrumental: instead,
in blaming and punishing we give these individuals what they deserve.19
Relationship-based criminal liability shares some of the features of
strict and vicarious criminal liability but is nevertheless distinct from
them.20 The justification for strict criminal liability lies in concerns for
public welfare;21 the justification for vicarious criminal liability lies in
16

For an explanation of the use of gendered pronouns in this Article, see infra note 91.
I note here that my position is just the opposite of David Enoch’s take on parents’
responsibility for crimes of their children. Enoch writes: “I am an individualist about
moral responsibility—I believe that you cannot be morally responsible for something
simply in virtue of being in a certain relationship with someone else who is morally
responsible for that thing . . . .” David Enoch, Being Responsible, Taking
Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency, in LUCK, VALUE & COMMITMENT: THEMES
FROM THE ETHICS OF BERNARD WILLIAMS 95, 97–98 (Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang
eds., 2012). I address Enoch’s account infra note 161–62.
18
The Responsible Corporate Officer (“RCO”) doctrine already allows for the
prosecution and punishment of an executive for a crime of his corporation to which the
executive did not contribute. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279–81
(1943). Still, the doctrine is much reviled. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think
About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1376–77 (2009)
(comparing the RCO doctrine to the ancient legal practice of frankpledge). And, as I
have argued elsewhere, attempts to defend the RCO doctrine turn on public policy, and
not desert-based grounds. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate
Criminal Law, 40 J. CORP. L. 439 (2015) [hereinafter Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault
Line]; Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of
Responsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371.
19
Paul Robinson also invokes cases involving parents and corporate executives in his
erudite and incisive treatment of vicarious criminal liability. Robinson, supra note 4, at
618 & nn.26–27. While Robinson thus studies the kinds of cases discussed here, his
interest is analytic, not critical or justificatory. See id. at 613.
20
Strict criminal liability typically requires that the defendant have satisfied the act
element of the crime. See, e.g., Steven S. Nemerson, Note, Criminal Liability Without
Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (1975); cf.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that some willed act is a
necessary condition for criminal liability). Liability is strict just insofar as the defendant
need not have had, or did not have, a culpable mental state. See Douglas Husak, Strict
Liability, Justice and Proportionality, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW:
SELECTED ESSAYS 152, 154 (2010). The individuals I contemplate need not have
participated in the criminal act at all; in fact, in none of the cases I discuss will the
defendant have taken any part in the crime. Criminal liability is for these defendants
nonetheless strict because neither their mental state nor the impossibility of their having
done anything to prevent the crime is relevant in determining their susceptibility to
prosecution and punishment.
21
The paradigmatic case here is Dotterweich. See 320 U.S. 277; see also Francis Bowes
17

the defendant’s own wrongdoing.22 By contrast, the justification for
assigning criminal liability on the account here arises from the nature of
the relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer. More
specifically, I shall argue that imputed criminal liability is—in
circumstances to be delineated here—conceptually and normatively
required by the relationships at issue.
Moreover, it is not just that the individuals in these relationships have
reason to think themselves blameworthy. We, impartial members of the
moral community, also sometimes have reason to see these individuals
as blameworthy, and so too join these individuals in blaming themselves.
And sometimes we have reason to treat their blameworthiness as a
ground of criminal liability. The work of this Article lies in spelling out
when and why, contra the fault principle, this is so.
One might think that the effort to provide grounds for blame
independent of fault is worse than worthless, nefarious even. If anything,
the criminal justice system is rife with too many prosecutions, too many
convictions, and too many people in jail—to say nothing of the problem
of over-criminalization more generally.23 My aim is not to add to this
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 68–70 (1933) (discussing
public welfare offenses that do not need proof of individual blameworthiness); Francis
Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689,
720 (1930) (discussing two conflicting interests: first, the important social interest in
well-being and security; and second, individual liberty interest of a defendant in not
being punished if not morally blameworthy); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 176 (5th ed. 2009) (describing the view that mens rea
may be foregone for public welfare offenses if the penalty is light and does not include
imprisonment); Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1995, at 72 (discussing how moral authority in a criminal justice system could
help reduce violent crime); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 (1997) (discussing how violation of minor regulatory laws can
be socially harmful); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 779 (2005)
(noting that evidence shows more states enacting strict liability and public welfare
offenses).
22
Vicarious criminal liability arises only in cases where the defendant is already
engaged in some crime with the others whose additional criminal acts are then imputed
to him. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735–36 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[S]hared
purpose to achieve jointly held illegal aims is the common thread among the diverse
doctrines of vicarious criminal responsibility.”). In the cases under consideration here,
the defendant need not be involved in the wrongdoer’s crime at all.
23
See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 3–45 (2008); SANFORD H. KADISH, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, in BLAME
AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1987); SANFORD H. KADISH,
More on Overcriminalization, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW 36 (1987); SANFORD H. KADISH, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 40
(1987).

state of affairs, which I along with many others deplore.24 But curiously,
the rampant prosecution and punishment does not extend from the street
to the suite.25 For example, we now know that widespread bank fraud
underlay the financial crisis of 2008, and yet only a handful of banking
executives were prosecuted and not a single one went to jail.26 And while
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced its new strategy of
targeting high-level executives in addressing corporate crime in Fall
2015,27 it has no desert-based justification to support its “crackdown,”28
and it has been accused of being “impractical” and out of touch with
reality.29 The Article has its ultimate payoff, then, in an account that
would justify the very strategy the DOJ has identified as crucial to
redressing organizational crime.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I clarify some of the key
terminology the Article employs. Part II seeks to motivate the claim that
fault is not a necessary condition for warranted blame by interrogating
24

See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 23; Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra
note 23, at 33.
25
See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, America Should Send More People to Prison, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/america-shouldsend-more-_b_6591730.html (“The multiple frauds that produced the financial
collapse, and cost ordinary people trillions of dollars in lost savings, lost homes and lost
jobs, did not result in a single banking executive going to prison.”); Joe Nocera,
Opinion, How to Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/opinion/nocera-how-to-prevent-oil-spills.html
(suggesting that jail time would be more effective than fines to prevent corporate
crimes); 155 CONG. REC. S2315–16 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009).
Other commentators have argued for the obverse claim—namely, that prosecutions
for street crime should be more like those for white-collar crimes. For example, Sara
Sun Beale argues that defendants accused of street crimes should enjoy more of the
protections afforded to white-collar criminals. Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal
Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503 (2007). But see Samuel W. Buell, Is the
White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823 (2014) (arguing that in fact it is
easier to prosecute and convict white-collar defendants).
In a similar vein, Darryl Brown contends that the pluralist aims of white-collar
prosecutions should apply as well in prosecutions for street crimes. Darryl K. Brown,
Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1295, 1345–60 (2001). These commentators are pursuing worthy agendas but
the ambition here is more far-reaching, since I seek to enlarge the set of individuals
appropriately liable to white-collar prosecutions in the first place.
26
Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216.
27
Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., on Individual
Accountability
for
Corporate
Wrongdoing
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
28
Former Deputy AG James Cole Says DOJ’s New White-Collar Crime Policy is
'Impractical',
A.B.A
NEWS
(Nov.
24,
2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2015/11/former_deputy_agjam.html.
29
Id.

the fault principle. The fault principle is so entrenched that virtually no
one bothers to argue for it anymore. The arguments instead attack
departures from the principle—none of which are convincing. Part III
begins the Article’s positive theoretical work. There, I refine the notions
of blame, accepting blame, and being blameworthy that I use here. I then
turn in Part IV to a lengthy examination of cases in which, progressively,
the connection between fault and blame comes apart. Much of the
discussion in this Part concerns moral psychology; almost none of it
concerns punishment. Nonetheless, this lengthy excursion into our moral
emotional reactions is warranted since the criminal law’s conception of
desert depends on a moral conception of desert.30 Thus a defendant
would not deserve punishment if he did not satisfy the conditions
necessary for moral blame.31 If we are to determine whether one may
deserve punishment even if one is not at fault, we must then first
determine whether one may be morally to blame even if one is not at
fault. This is the task of Part IV. The Article’s Conclusion seeks to draw
out the implications of the cases in Part IV for punishment.
Before turning to the Article’s arguments it will be useful to clarify
terminology.
I. SOME PRELIMINARY GROUND CLEARING
The notions of fault and blame are so intertwined in criminal law
doctrine and theory that the central claim of this Article—that one can be
blameworthy even if one is not at fault—may well come across as
30

See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–88 (1997) (noting that a
criminal prosecutor must not only prove facts, but must do so in a way sufficient “to
implicate the law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in judgment” and
[t]hus, the prosecutor may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors . . . to
convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable”); Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 171 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting “‘the relation
between criminal liability and moral culpability’ on which criminal justice depends”
(quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965))). For discussions noting
the ascendancy of retributivist justifications for punishment, see Russell L. Christopher,
Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843,
846–47 (2002) (“The U.S. Supreme Court, state courts, state legislatures, philosophers,
and legal scholars alike are increasingly acknowledging retributivism as the dominant
theory of punishment.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged
Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2012) (noting “a robust
revival of retributivism”).
31
This is not of course to say that it would be illegal to punish him. Malum prohibitum
offenses involve precisely the punishment of one who is (or at least who may be)
blameless; the same can be said for strict criminal liability. But cf. Husak, supra note
20, at 158 (distinguishing between formal and substantive strict criminal liability, and
arguing that in a case of formal strict criminal liability, the defendant might well have
possessed a culpable mental state; it is just that the state does not require that this be
proven in order to obtain a conviction).

incoherent. But it is not. Establishing that it is not will require that we get
clear on definitions.
In criminal law, to be at fault is to have committed a wrong without
justification or excuse.32 Depending on the jurist or theorist, fault is
either a necessary condition for blameworthiness,33 or fault and
blameworthiness are interchangeable, or one and the same thing.34 Either
way, the claim that one can be blameworthy even though one is not at
fault will seem, to these jurists and theorists, nonsensical. But if one
allows that a person can be blameworthy even if he or she is not at fault
then the standard assertion that criminal liability requires fault will seem
to do no more than beg the question.35
Here is a starting definition of blameworthiness that neither implies
nor denies that fault is necessary for blame: an individual is morally
blameworthy if we have good moral reasons to blame her. Being at fault

32

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (defining faulty
conduct as “conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interests”); John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, in
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 51, 63 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005) (defining fault as “a
shortfall of virtue that consists in the performance of actions that are both unjustified
and unexcused”).
33
See supra note 2 (collecting cites reporting that the criminal law does and should
impose blame only where the defendant is at fault).
34
See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 943, 945 (2000) (“Fault—also known as desert, culpability, or
blameworthiness—is the distinctive feature of the criminal law.” (footnote omitted));
Husak, supra note 20, at 162–63 (“Any acceptable justification of punishment
presupposes desert, which requires blame or fault in the defendant.”). To say that fault
and blameworthiness are interchangeable is to say that there is complete overlap
between conduct that is faulty and conduct that is blameworthy (i.e., the two have
identical extensions); to say that fault and blameworthiness are one and the same thing
is to say that they have the same definition (i.e., identical intensions).
35
Consider, for example, Herbert Packer’s contention that “moral blameworthiness
should be the indispensable condition precedent to [the] application [of the criminal
law].” Herbert Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107,
147–48. One can agree and yet still hold that one can be morally blameworthy in the
absence of fault. Or, for an especially vitriolic example, consider F. H. Bradley’s
argument:
Punishment is punishment, only where it is deserved. We pay the
penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if
punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it
is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an
abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be.
F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 26–27 (2d ed. 1927). One who holds my view can
assent to the first two propositions—that punishments and penalties should be imposed
only on those who deserve or owe them—but deny that only those who have done
wrong can deserve punishment or owe penalties.

is certainly one set of such reasons—indeed, the paradigmatic one.36 But
it is not the only one.
A necessary innovation for getting the argument off the ground will
be the construction of a vocabulary that does not simply conflate fault
with blameworthiness. I stipulate that one must be blameworthy if one is
to be appropriately subject to criminal liability. So far so good, as far as
the fault principle goes. But, against that principle, I will argue that there
are two broad grounds of blameworthiness, and only one is necessary to
ground blame. First and familiarly, one will be presumptively
blameworthy if one is at fault; second, one will be presumptively
blameworthy if one stands in the right kind of relationship to a wrong or
wrongdoer, even if one is not at fault. (The reason for which blame is
presumptive rather than conclusive will be made clear in what follows.)37
I shall refer to blame arising in the first way as fault-based and to blame
arising in the second as relational. To keep these two grounds of blame
distinct, I will reserve the terms “wrongdoing” and “culpable” (and their
associated adjectives, adverbs, etc.) for those cases where blame turns on
fault.38 The person who is blameworthy on relational grounds will then
be “non-culpable.” Finally, the term “guilt” here refers to the moral and
psychological concept, not to eligibility for conviction for a crime
(unless otherwise indicated). More specifically, “guilt” and
“blameworthy” are correlates: one bears appropriate guilt if and only if
one is blameworthy.39 It follows then that one can be guilty on my
account because one is at fault or because one stands in a blamegrounding relationship.
II. W(H)ITHER DEFENSES OF THE FAULT PRINCIPLE?
Given the sanctity of the fault principle, one might think it beyond
inquiry. Yet it is precisely because the fault principle has risen to the
36

Cf. Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289, 294 (2007)
(arguing that the requirement that one make a causal difference to a crime is merely the
paradigmatic, but not the only, case of blameworthy complicity).
37
See infra Section IV.A.3 and Section IV.B.
38
Culpability is typically associated with fault in criminal law doctrine. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.05, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985) (“Crime does and should mean condemnation and no
court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant’s act
was culpable.” (footnote omitted)). Under section 2.02(1), culpable means minimally
that the defendant “acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently . . . with
respect to each material element of the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 2015).
39
Bernard Williams describes the appropriate emotional response for the person who
faultlessly causes harm as “agent-regret.” BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 30
(1981). I discuss the relationship between faultless guilt and agent-regret infra, see
Section IV.A.2.

level of established dogma that the justification for it no longer
accompanies its appearance,40 and one who dares to wonder about its
foundations is left wanting.
There is of course an account frequently given to explain why the
state ought to be bound by the fault principle: the state is the entity
exclusively empowered to punish, punishments are things citizens want
to avoid,41 so the elements licensing punishment should be of the kind
citizens have the opportunity to avoid.42 The fault principle (along with
the voluntary act requirement)43 ensures that individuals will not be
punished for acts they could not avoid—those that the agent does not
will (e.g., those performed while she is unconscious),44 or performed in
innocent ignorance of the risk they impose,45 or under circumstances that
compel or coerce the agent’s criminal conduct.46 In this way, individuals
can protect themselves from the threat of state punishment, because they
40

Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 1232–33 (“The rationale for the retributive
conception of fairness has proved difficult to identify. . . . [W]e do note that, to us (and
to many others), the justifications usually offered [for the claim that wrongdoing
deserves punishment] seem virtually indistinguishable from restatements of the
definition of the notion of retribution.” (footnote omitted)).
41
See, e.g., Peter Cane, Responsibility and Fault: A Relational and Functional
Approach to Responsibility, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY
HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 81, 108 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001)
(“As agents, we have an interest in freedom of action, in being able to act without
incurring the serious penalties and blame that attach to criminal responsibility.”).
42
The view is most famously associated with H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181 (1968) (“[U]nless a man has the capacity and a
fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not be
applied to him.”); see also NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES
AND COMMUNITY VALUES 146 (1988) (“Both rationality and the capacity for
responsible action are thus for liberalism at once factual features of human nature and
sources of normative limits on the ways in which human beings may be treated,
particularly by political and other public institutions.”).
43
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless
his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act . . . .”); Gideon Yaffe, The
Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 174, 174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
44
For a volitional account of the act requirement, see, for example, MICHAEL S.
MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL LAW (1993). For an argument against this view, and urging that we restrict
criminal liability not to the (narrower set) of voluntary acts but instead to the (broader
set) of acts reflecting our practical agency, see Vincent Chiao, Action and Agency in the
Criminal Law, 15 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2009).
45
See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L.
REV. 35, 35 (1939) (“[M]istake of fact is sufficient for exculpation if what was done
would have been lawful had the facts been as they were reasonably supposed to be.”).
46
See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law
Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 575, 577 (2011) (describing the role that compulsion and coercion play
in protecting the defendant from criminal liability).

can be assured that the circumstances warranting punishment are within
their control.47
Whatever the merits of the argument that fault is necessary for the
state to punish, the argument cannot justify the fault principle as it is
generally construed because that principle is invoked not merely as a
limit on state action. Instead, it is taken to enshrine a fundamental moral
commitment about desert. To take one emblematic statement: “[a]ny
acceptable justification of punishment presupposes desert, which
requires blame or fault in the defendant.”48 To question the fault
principle on its face, rather than its use as a constraint on state action, is
then to ask why only those who are at fault—that is, only those who
commit a wrong without justification or excuse49—deserve blame.
The answer, such as it is, proceeds not by way of a positive defense
of the fault principle so much as a series of arguments against blame or
punishment without fault. I address each of these in turn and, finding
none of them compelling, reflect on why the fault principle has
nonetheless managed to grip us so tenaciously.
A. Voluntarism
Those with voluntarist commitments hold that we should be blamed
only where we have chosen to engage in conduct that we know or should
know is wrong.50 To impose blame where we could not have done other
than what we did, or for the acts of someone whom we cannot control or
have no duty to control, is to hold us responsible for something outside
of our agency,51 and so to treat us more harshly than we deserve.
47

I go on to challenge the criminal law’s voluntarist commitment below. See infra
Section II.A.
48
Husak, supra note 20, 162–63; see also Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the
Deserving?, 26 NOÛS 447, 447–48 (1992) (suggesting that voluntary commission of a
crime is necessary to deserve punishment by stating “[t]he voluntary choice of the agent
to commit a crime he knows is subject to punishment is crucial in establishing his
desert”); cf. ANDREW VON HIRSH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 51
(1976) (“The offender may justly be subjected to certain deprivations because he
deserves it; and he deserves it because he has engaged in wrongful conduct—conduct
that does or threatens injury and that is prohibited by law.”).
49
See supra note 31.
50
See, e.g., HART, supra note 41, at 181; LACEY, supra note 41, at 146.
51
Those who subscribe to voluntarism believe, contrary to “hard determinists,” see,
e.g., Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1408 n.41
(2011), that there is a meaningful distinction between actions we choose to undertake
and those that are forced upon us. Since our criminal law either presupposes free will,
see BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *27–28 (“[P]unishments are . . . only inflicted for the
abuse of that free will, which God has given to man . . . .”); State v. Jones, 577 P.2d
357, 361 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), or is committed to bracketing the question, see, e.g.,
Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091, 1144–45
(1985); Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28

Voluntarism rules out clear-cut cases of compulsion—the gun-toyour-head type case, for example. But it does not necessarily rule out
relationship-based cases (where one member of an intimate or
employment relationship is blamed, and perhaps also punished, for the
wrong of another). Many of these relationships are entered into
voluntarily.52 Voluntarism, if it is to be compelling, has to allow that we
are responsible not only for the immediate consequences of our decisions
but also for some of their downstream consequences too. The question
then becomes whether the consequences—again, the wrongs committed
by one with whom one has chosen to stand in a particular relationship—
are so far downstream as to escape the voluntarist’s sense of the
appropriate scope of our agency. I argue in Part IV that they are not.
B. Status
Perhaps the problem with relationship-based culpability is not so
much that it is unavoidable but that it punishes on the basis of status,
rather than conduct, and thereby runs afoul of settled constitutional
doctrine.53 But the reasons for rejecting status crimes do not impugn the
CARDOZO L. REV. 2545 (2007), I do not pursue this aspect of the metaphysics of agency
here.
52
This is the justification Markel, Collins, and Leib offer for parental responsibility
laws. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 85–96 (2009). For the claim
that this view fails to take account of background inequalities that can undermine the
voluntary assumption of parental duties, see Naomi Cahn, Protect and Preserve?, 13
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2010).
The relationships I have in mind—that of a parent to her child, or a military
commander or executive to her subordinates—are all normally entered into voluntarily.
I note however that we come to owe obligations even in virtue of relationships we enter
non-voluntarily. Filial obligations are paradigmatic here. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler,
Relationships and Responsibility, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 189, 191–92 (1997). I allow
that there may be cases where children should take on guilt for their parents’
transgressions, but I do not pursue that line of thought here.
53
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); cf. United States v. Scales, 367
U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961) (“In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the
imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to
the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity . . . , that
relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in
order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). But
cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (holding that the states may punish acts
that are attendant on status such as the state may punish sleeping in public places, even
if it may not punish homelessness); Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal
Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 417 (1975) (“Certainly [Robinson] cannot be read to
do away with all crimes of status. These have a long history in the common law and in
statutory law; they have not been fundamentally challenged by the Court.”). See
generally Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-orDie Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1620 (1995) (discussing the plight

cases discussed here for two reasons. First, part of the opposition to
status crimes is just a species of voluntarism. The basic idea is that a
status is something over which one has no control and no one should be
found guilty on the basis of characteristics over which they have no
control.54 In response, we should note that the voluntarist worry does not
necessarily obtain: we have seen that voluntarism does not necessarily
rule out relationship-based culpability.55
Second, in the cases to be considered here, warranted blame follows
not from the status of being in a particular relationship as from the norms
governing the relationship in question. Thus, for example, the parents
who should take themselves to be blameworthy for their children’s
crimes owe this obligation because of their role and not their status; the
obligation would not obtain if, say, the individual in question were a
biological parent who had given the child-turned-criminal up for
adoption many years before. And there is nothing mysterious, let alone
nefarious, about legally enforceable role-based obligations—think here
of the obligations parents bear to take adequate care of their minor
children, breach of which is in some places criminal.56
of the homeless in the face of laws that require them to “follow the law and die, or stay
alive and risk arrest” and proposing “that courts must invalidate statues that offer
people no lawful choice but death.” (emphasis omitted)).
54
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1242 (1996)
(noting the argument that status-based crimes are unfair because “having a condition
one cannot alter should not by itself make one guilty of a crime”). Closely related to the
notion that status crimes are in tension with voluntarism is the claim that status crimes
run afoul of the act requirement. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak:
Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1184 (2011) (noting
that commentators and jurists decry status crimes because they violate “the supposed
‘act requirement’ of criminal law”); Yaffe, supra note 43, at 174–75 (decrying the
crime of appearing drunk in public because it would punish status and not an act); cf.
Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1545, 1607 (2013) (noting that there are two problems with status crimes: (1) they
eschew the act requirement, and (2) they assign criminal liability for a status the
defendant bears involuntarily). But cf. Louis Henkin, Foreword, On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 69 (1968) (challenging the supposed distinction between status and
act).
55
See supra text accompanying note 51 (noting that we enter into some relationships
voluntarily).
56
See, e.g., Child Neglect & Abandonment State Statutes, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N
(Mar.
13,
2007),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ncpca_statute_child_neglect_abandonment_3_07.pdf.
Socalled parental responsibility laws are, however, controversial. See, e.g., Jennifer M.
Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents
(Wake
Forest
Univ.
Legal
Studies
Paper
No.
05-08,
2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=673451 (discussing cases where parents are prosecuted for
negligent homicide where they leave their children in hot, parked cars and the children
die as a result). I discuss parental responsibility laws infra Section IV.B.

Of course, nothing so far entails that the parenting role does include
an obligation to take responsibility for the crimes of one’s child. But if
that obligation does not obtain it will not be because no one should be
held responsible on the mere basis of status.
C. Taint
Group membership is one kind of status that commentators and
courts have found particularly dubious as a ground of culpability. The
idea here is that one group member’s crime should not taint the other
members unless57 (or perhaps even if)58 there is reason to believe that the
group as a whole authorized or ratified or at the very least tolerated the
crime in question. In the absence of these elements, we have nothing but
guilt by association, which commentators decry as an unworthy relic of
the Ancients,59 one that is too primitive for enlightened folk like us.60
Some of this is right, and some of it overblown. To be sure, blaming
and perhaps also punishing one person for another’s crime simply
because the two share membership in the same group is a grave injustice,
rightly condemned as invidious discrimination (racism, sexism, etc.)
where the group is identity-based, especially where the identifying
characteristic is ascriptive.61 Mere membership in a group should not
57

See, e.g., LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS 3–4 (1987); cf. JANNA
THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATIONS AND HISTORICAL
INJUSTICE 6 (2002) (justifying imposing national treaty obligations, or reparations for
their breach, on the current generation even though the treaty was entered into by an
earlier generation because the individual signatories to the treaty acted on behalf of the
nation, which ratified the treaty and continues to exist to this day).
58
See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 686 (1968)
(arguing that those who opposed the group wrong should not bear responsibility or
liability for it); Howard McGary, Morality and Collective Liability, 20 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 157, 157 (1986) (same); Michele Moody-Adams, Culture, Responsibility and
Affected Ignorance, 104 ETHICS 291 (1994) (same).
59
See, e.g., Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 2 (containing a provision for
frankpledge, whereby groups of 100 men would be answerable for the crime of any of
them); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1203–04 (1985) (describing an analogous Ancient practice involving
collective liability for tort damages). See generally George P. Fletcher, The Storrs
Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE
L.J. 1499, 1509, 1566 (2002) (describing the Ancients’ attachment to collective
responsibility); M. Stuart Madden, Paths of Western Law After Justinian, 22 WIDENER
L.J. 757, 772 (2013) (“In the customary law of Germanic tribes, the victim's kinship
group would be permitted to wreak retribution upon the slayer himself or his family.”);
Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the Guilty:
The Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 84
(2007) (“One of the defining characteristics of primitive law enforcement is its reliance
on collective or group responsibility . . . .”).
60
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 17 (railing against frankpledge).
61
Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

entail that members share responsibility for one another’s transgressions.
But membership in some groups does license our transmitting blame
from some members to others, independent of the latter’s participation in
the transgression. In particular, membership in some groups comes with
expectations that the member will shoulder blame for other members’
wrongs. This is common knowledge among members and outsiders, and
it is not the product of a “barbaric”62 mentality but instead a valuable
element constituting group bonds. I elaborate on the grounds for the
transmission of responsibility among group members in the next Part,
but we can already see that the idea is commonplace and not undue if we
consider the response citizens owe when their nation-state has
transgressed. In those cases, it will be appropriate for the nation-state to
apologize and offer repair,63 and for its members to display contrition.64
This is so not only when large swaths of the citizenry participated in or
supported the transgression at the time of its occurrence. It is also true
where many opposed the transgression as it occurred, and as forcefully
as they could.65 These people owe an apology and their share of the
appropriate restitution not because they happen to be the compatriots of
others who participated in the transgression but because the transgression
is their nation-state’s, and so it belongs to the wrongdoers as well as the
would-be dissidents. There are then cases where some members’
War, art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (“No protected person may be punished for
an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”).
62
Contra H.D. Lewis, The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility, in
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE AT MY LAI 119, 121 (Peter
A. French ed., 1972); see NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES
188 (2008) (referring to this practice as “tribal”).
63
See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations,
23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 314, 316–19 (2005) (discussing World War II reparations and
the rise of an offending state’s moral responsibility to harmed states).
64
See, e.g., Brian Weiner, National Apologies: Extraordinary Politics Within Ordinary
Times 1 (Oct. 27–29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented at Repairing the Past:
Confronting the Legacies of Slavery, Genocide, & Caste, Yale University),
http://glc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/justice/weiner.pdf (recognizing the distinction
between apologies and contrition and analyzing the modern trend of nation state
apologies as compared to the traditionally private realm of apologies).
65
For example, some opponents of George W. Bush voted against him in the 2004
election, and yet posted photos of themselves holding signs saying, “I’m sorry,” after he
won.
See
Gallery,
SORRY
EVERYBODY,
http://www.sorryeverybody.com/index_old.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). The
phenomenon of apologizing for a wrong in which one did not participate arises for
corporations too. Consider, for example, Wachovia Bank’s apology to “all Americans,
and especially to African-Americans and people of African descent,” issued after
Wachovia learned that its predecessor owned slaves and accepted slaves as collateral.
Associated Press, Wachovia Apologizes to Black Americans, NBC NEWS (June 2, 2005)
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8076165/ns/business-us_business/t/wachovia-apologizesblack-americans/#.WCUoGeErKRs.

transgression subjects others to blame but the transmission of
responsibility is not illicit.
D. A Natural History of the Fault Principle
If none of the proffered objections to deviations from the fault
principle rule out the kind of shared blame at issue here, why then has
the fault principle so completely held us in its sway? Given my
skepticism, I am not in a position to defend the claim that fault is
necessary for warranted blame and punishment. But I will venture to
offer some quick thoughts about why we might have come to believe that
one is blameworthy only where one is at fault. First, there is something
doubtlessly true about the fault principle—namely, that fault is a
sufficient condition for one to warrant blame.66 Second, faulty wrongs
have a special sting, and so a special salience.67 This is just the thought
underpinning Justice Holmes’s famous edict that “even a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”68 Further,
blame and sanction have regulative consequences: they aim—
successfully for the most part—to deter the blamed party from repeating
the conduct prompting our censure.69 We are, then, likely most primed to
activate blame’s deterrent potential where the wrong is one that the agent
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OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009)
(1881). While Holmes had in mind intentional wrongs, it is clear that there are other
guilty mental states—recklessness and gross negligence, for example—even if these
mark out crimes of less “serious culpability.” See Michael S. Moore, Intention,
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Wall, eds., forthcoming).
69
Cf. HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 89, 106–07 (1976) (identifying the
pain of guilt as part of its function); JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon VIII: Upon Resentment, in
FIFTEEN SERMONS 92, 100 (Ibis Publ’g 1987) (1860) (arguing that, where virtue fails,
individuals may nonetheless be deterred from pursuing wrongdoing by the anticipated
unpleasantness of the resentment their wrongdoing would elicit).

can avoid in the future. But faultless wrongs are just those wrongs that
the agent cannot reasonably avoid. So, rebuking faultless wrongs seems
not to serve any deterrent ends. Finally, it may well be that not only our
most painful but also our most common experiences of blame arise
where the blamed party is at fault.70 As such, fault is a familiar feature of
blame for us.
All of this suggests that our experience of blame does typically and
prominently involve fault and so we might naturally have come to take
fault to be a prerequisite for blame.71 The story one might tell about the
relationship between blame and fault is then of the Humean fallacy
genre.72 On Hume’s account, we believe that A causes B (e.g., dark
clouds cause rain) but the belief is unwarranted. The only thing we really
know is that B generally occurs soon after A. But nature is not always
uniform; for all we know, the next time B occurs, A may not have
preceded it. We have no way of proving that A is a necessary cause of B,
and so no reason to think that we cannot have B without A.
Applying the argument to the fault principle: we see that fault
commonly attends blame. As a result, we have come to believe—
mistakenly—that fault is necessary for warranted blame. We cannot
prove that fault is necessary for blame, and so we in fact have no reason
to think that we cannot have blame without fault. The fault principle is
then the result of our having come to mistake common associations with
necessary connections.73 What we need to upend the story that links fault
and blame by necessity is a counter-narrative—or, as here, a series of
stories (real and fiction) involving warranted blame without fault.
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See Kutz, supra note 36, at 300.
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RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 220, 221–22 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (noting that the view that
guilt is appropriate only if one is at fault provides a “‘hegemony’ of moral guilt over the
whole sphere of guilt”); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special
Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43–44 (1980) (explaining the role of retribution
in primitive societies along economic lines).
72
See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 76–77 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch,
eds., rev. 3d ed. 1975).
73
The insight is not unlike one that Bernard Williams proffered. See WILLIAMS, supra
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III. BLAME WITHOUT FAULT: SOME PRELIMINARIES
To begin, it will be helpful to say more about the function of blame
and blaming, and what the relationship between a person’s accepting
blame and our blaming her is.
A. The Function of Blame
Typically, theorists argue that blame serves one or more of the
following three functions: Blame (1) registers a demerit in one’s moral
“ledger”;74 (2) causes the victim to experience the good of having her
injury recognized,75 and her anger expiated in the act of blaming (or in
witnessing others blame on her behalf);76 and (3) provides occasion for
the wider community to enforce or affirm certain norms and values.77
To elaborate: the ledger view, as it is typically expressed, sees in
blame the formation of a judgment that the blamed party has done
something morally wrong and a resulting assessment (or re-assessment)
of the agent’s character as having some defect.78 Blame could arise in
virtue of one’s relationships on the thought that one had poorly chosen
one’s intimates. But one need not have been at fault in choosing one’s
intimates to bear blame here. In the latter kind of case, the demerit or
negative assessment goes not to one’s character but to one’s person. The
thought is not that one ought to work to have more moral virtue but
74
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instead that one is marked by one’s relationships—marked in a way that
is meaningful and made appropriate by the meaning and value in those
relationships. All of that should become clearer in what follows.
While the “demerit” component describes blame’s effect on the
blamed party, the second and third functions of blame describe the role
blame plays for the victim of the wrong, and sometimes for bystanders
too. Blame’s role in recognizing the victim’s injury foregrounds blame’s
therapeutic or restorative function.79 As we will see in the cases that
follow, tragedies can leave their victims, or their victims’ loved ones,
with a surfeit of anguish. Cosmic tragedies—those for which no one is to
blame—may be the worst of all because there is no outlet in anger for the
pain they cause. Where we can find a target of blame, then, our blaming
him or her provides us with a means for discharging some of that pain.
To be sure, blame’s therapeutic value must be weighed carefully against
the pain that blame inflicts.80 Precisely because it involves a transfer of
pain from victim to the target of blame, we should not undertake this
transfer unless the target of blame deserves it. But, again, I leave open
for now the question of whether the target of blame can deserve it only if
she is at fault. And so long as she does deserve it, blame’s therapeutic
function gives us a reason to think blame appropriate—again, not a
decisive one, but not an inconsiderable one either.
Blame also offers us an opportunity to enforce norms or obligations
that flow from certain relationships, which is what (3) denotes. As we
shall see in Part IV, when one party to a relationship takes on blame for
the wrong of the other party, the first expresses her recognition that her
agency is bound up with the wrongdoer’s. Where these relationships are
good in and of themselves, and where intertwining of agency is partly
constitutive of the relationship, we have reason to value this intertwining,
and the taking on of blame that it mandates. We preserve and promote
these relationships by affirming the taking on of blame; or, where a
person has not taken on blame when she should, we enforce norms that
make these relationships valuable by imposing upon her the blame she
should have assumed herself, by blaming her.
Given these multiple functions, the conception of blame at issue here
is clearly a pluralist one,81 pulling together several understandings of
blame’s function that often appear separately.82 I think this is right but,
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for strategic reasons, it is also important to operate with this pluralist
conception. After all, it would be far easier to argue that one may be
blamed without fault if I had instead adopted an anemic conception of
what it meant to blame someone—if blaming someone wasn’t something
that one had multiple reasons to want to avoid. To avoid being charged
with having stacked the deck unduly in my favor, then, I operate with
this fuller conception here.
With that said, blame need not fulfill each of the three functions on
every occasion when it is appropriate. Of particular relevance here, cases
of faultless blame likely won’t function as an outlet for anger so much as
an opportunity to affirm certain ways of relating to one another. Anger is
occasioned by conduct that reflects the agent’s ill will or disregard of
others83—anger, in other words, might be the unique or at least the
special province of faulty conduct. But a person might have reason to
take herself to be blameworthy even if she has not acted with disregard
toward others. And where she does have such reason, others might have
reason to take her to be blameworthy too, because taking on blame is
what her relationship to the victim or the wrongdoer requires, and we
affirm the obligation and so the relationship itself when we endorse her
blaming herself, as we can do by blaming her too.
B. Accepting Blame and Blaming
The account to be advanced is normative: it privileges the
perspective that the agent should adopt in determining whether she
should take herself to be blameworthy. Here, I seek to describe (1) why
we should privilege the perspective the agent should adopt, rather than
the one she does adopt; (2) the difference between “accepting blame”
and “taking oneself to be blameworthy,” and (3) when and why a
person’s taking herself to be blameworthy makes it the case that others
have license to blame her.
1. The Ideal Agent’s Perspective
In the following cases, I will be relying on the norms and obligations
that obtain within the relationships in question. These norms and
obligations, we shall see, sometimes make it the case that one should
blame’s functions. Tim Scanlon, for example, conceives of blaming as a way of
registering that someone has displayed attitudes that impair your relationship with her,
and make it appropriate for you to revise your relationship with her. T.M. SCANLON,
MORAL DIMENSIONS 157 (2008). I do not focus on this function of blame since I think
it best as an account of blame between intimates or, more tenuously, members of a
tight-knit community, but poorly suited to tracking the kind of blame that underpins
criminal law.
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judge herself to be blameworthy even if one’s conduct would not be
deemed faulty under the fault principle. Given that it is norms and
obligations that underpin the determination that one should (or should
not) judge herself to be blameworthy, we need not take the agent’s selfassessment as authoritative. Instead we may judge whether an agent’s
belief about her blameworthiness is correct, and we would do so in light
of various standards. The fault principle is one such standard but not the
only one. Other standards flow, we shall see, from the norms and
obligations that obtain in the relationship under consideration.
2. Accepting Blame Versus Taking Oneself to Be Blameworthy
It will be important to distinguish between (1) cases in which
someone accedes to act as if she is to blame, all the while hewing
privately to the belief that she does not deserve blame; and (2) cases in
which someone agrees to take herself to warrant blame. I refer to the
former as accepting blame and to the latter as taking oneself to be
blameworthy. Both entail a willingness to accept the material
consequences of being blameworthy—a strike in one’s moral ledger,
words of reproach from others, perhaps other social sanctions still, etc.
But only (2), taking oneself to be blameworthy, mandates a change in
one’s beliefs about whether one deserves blame.84 Thus, one who merely
accepts blame does not recognize the legitimacy of the victim’s
grievance, or the community’s indignation, and so there can be no real
remorse on her part. She offers herself up as a target of anger as an act of
kindness, but not as an act of contrition. On the other hand, when a
person takes himself to be blameworthy, he incurs an obligation to
recognize that he deserves to be treated as a target of anger, and this
recognition mandates that he come to feel contrite too. In some cases,
when a person takes himself to be blameworthy, he is then required to
come to believe, if he does not already believe, that he is at fault.85 But
not all cases in which one ought to take oneself to be blameworthy are
like this, we shall see.86
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See infra Section IV.C (discussing the grounds upon which an executive who is
innocent of his corporation’s crime ought nonetheless to take himself to be
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3. Taking Oneself to Be Blameworthy and Blaming
Suppose that a person does have an obligation to take herself to be
blameworthy. Why would this entail that others are permitted to blame
her?
Sometimes the act or outcome rendering someone blameworthy is
one about which we, the public, may complain, even if we are not its
most immediate victims. We can see this when we consider our response
to malum in se wrongs, which we view as wrongs committed against all
persons, and not just their victims.87 So if an individual A recognizes that
she has offended against us, and that she must take herself to be
blameworthy for her offense, then she must recognize that we have
license to blame her. What it is for her to take herself to be blameworthy
is for her to hold herself out as a target of reproach, and invite at least
some others—in particular, those who are licensed to complain—to join
her in finding her blameworthy and treating her as such. All else being
equal, we do her no wrong in taking up the invitation, though I shall
argue that sometimes other considerations make it the case that we
should decline it.88
But if the act or outcome for which A takes herself to be
blameworthy is not one that concerns us, then bystanders have no license
to blame her.89 The situation is no different from the garden-variety case
where one is at fault for having wronged an intimate and the wrong in
question is one we deem to be a private matter. In that case, it is
improper for impartial third parties to blame. But the fault principle plays
no role in our determination that third parties should refrain from
blaming. Instead it is norms of privacy that do so. These same norms
87
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should militate against blaming where the obligation to take oneself to be
blameworthy is not fault-based, but the underlying grievance is also a
private matter. We will see this norm against intervention played out in
what follows.
IV. CASES OF FAULTLESS BLAME
I turn now to a series of cases aimed at illustrating that blame can be
warranted solely in light of the functions of blame adduced in Part II, and
even in cases where the target of blame is not at fault. Together, the
cases offer a critical phenomenology of blame: I seek to describe the
emotional reactions likely to be experienced in each of the situations and
to comment on whether they are fitting (are they prompted by an
accurate evaluation of their object?), as well as whether they ought to be
endorsed (would it be good all things considered to experience them?). I
begin with relationships between friends and family, because these are
familiar and because taking on blame within these relationships need not,
and typically does not, eventuate in any kind of social or institutional
response (the state will not heap punishment upon the parent who takes
himself to be blameworthy for an accident of his child of which the
parent is in fact innocent). Without the worry that admitting
blameworthiness will render us liable to social sanction or state
punishment, we might well be more inclined to take on blame. So, the
intimate context is one where we will most readily see blame and fault
coming apart.90
I then move from the family context to the corporate context, and
consider cases where a CEO should take himself to be blameworthy for a
crime of his corporation for which he is not at fault.91 In the last Section
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of this Part, I consider possible objections. The work of this Part
concerns only the circumstances grounding blame; I defer to the next
Part the criminal law implications of the conclusions reached here.
A. Disentangling Blame and Fault in Intimate Contexts: A Tragic
Accident
This Section reaches conclusions that the adherent of the fault
principle should find surprising: First, the standards governing what
counts as faulty conduct vary according to the perspective from which
one judges: Thus, parents, for example, should judge themselves more
harshly than outsiders judge them. That is not the same as saying that
parents should hold themselves to higher standards when their conduct
affects their children. Both the adherent of the fault principle and I can
allow that parents owe their children a heightened standard of care. But
here is where we diverge: The adherent of the fault principle will think
that the amount of blame someone deserves varies only according to the
magnitude or severity of one’s fault. By contrast, I aim to show that the
amount of deserved blame can also turn on the nature of the relationship
between the wrongdoer and the victim. Thus, a parent can correctly take
herself to be more blameworthy when her wrong results in an injury to
her child rather than a stranger even if she is, and she knows that she is,
equally at fault with respect to each of them. Further, I seek to establish
that one can be blameworthy even if one is not at fault at all, and solely
by virtue of one’s having caused harm to a loved one. The first two subsections here contain illustrations of these phenomena.
Second, and more surprising, where both the parent’s and our
conclusions about warranted blame diverge, but both are correct from the
perspective from which these conclusions are formed, we should
sometimes adopt the parent’s conclusion. Whether we should replace our
conclusion with the parent’s will depend, on the one hand, on whether
blaming her will satisfy the functions of blame adduced above and, on
the other hand, on whether there are countervailing reasons that militate
against our blaming (e.g., that she is grieving and her grief is suffering
enough). These considerations are aired in sub-section 3, below.
1. Lots of Blame with Only Minor Fault
I begin here by contemplating a case in which a child is killed in a
car accident for which no one is at fault and yet some of the individuals
involved take themselves to be blameworthy—as they should, we will
see. Bernard Williams offers a famous example involving something like
the-womens-leadership-gap/. I use male pronouns to refer to the CEO in light of this
(lamentable) reality.

faultless self-blame. He describes a lorry driver who, although driving
impeccably, kills a young child who has darted unexpectedly into the
road.92 Williams contends that the driver will react differently to the
death than would a mere bystander, and with good reason, since the
driver’s agency has been implicated in the death in a way that the
bystander’s has not. Who we are, Williams says, depends on what we
have done and what consequences our actions bring about, and this is so
for faulty and faultless actions alike.93 Thus the driver’s biography has
been punctuated by this tragic event—it figures in the narrative of his life
in a way different from the way it will figure in the life of a mere
bystander to the event. That we have reason to feel ourselves more
implicated where some harm arose as a result of our actions, faultless
though they may be, is for Williams not merely understandable but the
mark of a decent character.94 Thus, he contends that “some doubt would
be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily moved to th[e] position”
of a mere spectator after being reminded that the accident was not his
fault.95
There is much puzzlement over what features of the driver’s situation
give rise, or should give rise, to his distinctive experience.96 If what the
driver regrets is the fact of his own involvement, then there seems little
reason to affirm his reaction; after all, the tragedy in the event
overwhelmingly resides in the child’s death, and not in the driver’s nowaltered biography. On this understanding, then, the driver seems to
exhibit an unseemly narcissism. But what else about the driver’s
involvement would give him reason to experience the tragedy differently
from a bystander? The details of the lorry driver case are quite sparse, so
it is hard to know just what beliefs underpin the driver’s reaction and so
just what shape the driver’s emotions take.97 But we can make progress
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if we turn to a case that bears a great deal of similarity to that of the lorry
driver, with one twist: The agent in question is no mere stranger to the
child-victim; she is instead the child’s mother.
The example comes from the Pulitzer-prize winning play, Rabbit
Hole,98 and the central event of the play, which has taken place even
before the play begins, involves a woman, Becca, who is in her front
yard with her four-year-old son, Danny, when the family dog runs into
the street. Danny follows and he is hit by a car coming down the street.
The driver is a high school student who has just earned his license but
there is no reason to think the driver is at fault. Danny dies and Becca is
wracked by guilt.
It would not be difficult to massage the elements of the plot such that
they fit within the contours of the fault principle, and to therefore arrive
at a conventional understanding of Becca’s guilt. Becca might believe
that Danny was able to run off only because she let her attention lapse,
her having done so was at least negligent, and so she rightly experiences
guilt over his death. On the other hand, some of us might be disinclined
to find fault even here. Full-time parenting is exhausting, unfailing rapt
attention is too much to ask of any parent, most of us have moments
when we are distracted, and most of us, thankfully, are never made to
pay for these distractions in the way that Becca has been. Becca is not a
worse parent than we are—she is not even a substandard parent on this
way of viewing the matter. She is just the victim of bad luck. Should we
then take her guilt to be unreasonable?
In thinking about Becca’s guilt it will be useful to invoke a
distinction advanced by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, between an
emotion’s fittingness and its all-things-considered propriety.99 For
D’Arms and Jacobson, an emotion is fitting if “it accurately presents its
object as having certain evaluative features.”100 To take an example of
theirs, envy is the fitting response of an untenured professor to a
colleague who receives tenure because envy is the emotion that “portrays
a rival as having a desirable possession that one lacks, and it casts this
circumstance in a specific negative light.”101 But even if envy fits, it
might nonetheless be all-things-considered improper. If one’s newly
tenured colleague deserves her promotion, if she has been a good friend,
if she would experience nothing but unadulterated happiness were the
tables turned, then one should recognize that envy, fitting as it is, is not
the emotion one ought to experience.102
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Now, the claim about propriety presupposes that one’s emotions are
appropriately subject to moral judgment. Insofar as one thinks of one’s
emotional responses as beyond one’s control, one might think the claim
odd, if not altogether wrong. Yet those who defend the idea that
emotions are proper subjects of moral evaluation acknowledge that
emotions often come upon us unbidden. They contend, however, that
when one judges the propriety of an emotion, one seeks to evaluate not
the emotion just as it has risen to consciousness, but instead what might
be called one’s considered emotions: We often feel things we know we
should not—jealousy or schadenfreude, for example. We should blame
ourselves for having these feelings if, but only if, we allow them to take
hold rather than trying to extinguish them.103 In this and the next subsection, I consider only the fittingness and propriety of the first-person
emotion—i.e., Becca’s guilt. In Section IV.A.3, I turn to whether we,
impartial observers of Becca’s situation, should blame Becca as she
blames herself.
Returning now to Becca, what might make her guilt fitting? Here is
one explanation, but not one that ultimately works. Suppose that Becca
agrees that she did do all she could to prevent Danny’s death. In more
reflective moments, she acknowledges that she is without fault. But she
nonetheless takes refuge in a kind of imagined culpability given that
guilt can function as a diversion: Guilt sustains a sensible narrative about
the tragedy. It allows Becca to tell a story about what made it the case
that Danny died, and it is a story with a villain—Becca—onto whom she
can expiate some of her anguish in the form of self-directed indignation.
Painful as this is, it is perhaps less devastating than the brute accident,
the cosmic injustice, that purveyor of senseless tragedy that provides no
target for any of the agony that it inflicts.104
Now, while this account can explain the etiology of Becca’s guilt, it
of whether one should be blamed, and that the latter is “sensitive to a host of
considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent's responsibility
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does not show her guilt to be fitting. On D’Arms and Jacobson’s
account, guilt is fitting if Becca accurately sees herself as bearing blame
for Danny’s death.105 But on the explanation just proffered, Becca does
not accurately see herself as bearing blame; she would acknowledge, if
pressed, that she merely imagines herself to have been at fault. She does
not truly believe that she was.
But there are multiple scenarios that would make Becca’s guilt
fitting. I explore two of them here.
a. Cases of uncertainty about the facts
Becca’s guilt might be fitting if, from her perspective, it reasonably
appears that she was at fault. We expect parents to go above and beyond
the call of duty; when a child’s life is at stake, we expect parents to do
everything in their power to prevent their child’s death. We, impassive
observers of Becca’s case, might well be willing to grant that she did
everything she could to prevent Danny’s death, and so think her entirely
free of omission liability. But she is beset by the crushing doubt that she
could have done still more—reacted sooner, run faster, reached Danny in
time—and that her failure to have done more constitutes her fault.
Insofar as Becca truly and not unreasonably believes that she is at fault
(as opposed to her indulging a comforting fiction), she has reason to feel
guilty. Her guilt is then fitting since it is responsive to her expanded but
not irrational sense of her own agency. Becca’s guilt accurately presents
her as having culpably caused Danny’s death—culpably because, by her
not unreasonable lights, she did less than she could and should have to
have prevented his death, and so she is at fault.106
Importantly, Becca’s guilt, on this scenario, is not unreasonable
because it does not defy the truth about whether she was at fault, even if
we impartial observers have reason to believe that it was more likely
than not that she was not at fault. Put differently, Becca’s judgment that
she was at fault trades on a general causal indeterminacy, and it trades on
that indeterminacy in just the direction it should, given her role as
105
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Danny’s parent. We are not always in a position to be clear about the
causal facts.107 As such, there is some room to fudge the causal
metaphysics when it comes to determining what should count as the true
scope of a person’s causal agency. And where there is this room, moral
values may, and indeed sometimes should, decide the issue. This is just
the rationale for giving someone—especially someone with whom we
are in a trusting relationship—the benefit of the doubt. When we do so,
we do not suspend judgment. Instead, we overcome our doubts by
deferring to their version of the facts, and endeavoring to come to
believe it to be true. In this way, norms of loyalty or solidarity decide
what we will take to be true.
We can understand that someone in Becca’s position might
overcome her doubts about her causal role in a similar way. On this
thought, Becca’s anguishing suspicion that she might have made a
difference would then not be a delusion born of a perverse sense of
grandeur. Just the opposite: it would reflect a clear-eyed humility about
our ability to make causal determinations with anywhere near complete
certainty, and a choice to err on the more unforgiving side, the side that
implicates rather than exculpates. Given this choice, Becca’s guilt would
be responsive to a not inaccurate picture of the world, and so it is fitting.
Now it is important to note that Becca’s guilt would fit the scenario
only if there were room to question whether she could reasonably have
done more than she did. There comes a point where it is too far-fetched
to believe that one could have made a difference. Perhaps parents,
contemplating their interactions with their kids, should be expansive
when it comes to identifying just where that point is. But that does not
mean that the boundary between the plausible and the completely
improbable disappears.108 The account here allows for guilt in
circumstances well beyond what the fault principle contemplates, but it
is not completely insensitive to the bounds of causation.109
But why should a parent be so keen to conclude that she was at fault
and thus is worthy of blame? Or to put the question in D’Arms and
Jacobson’s terms, is parental guilt in these cases proper? Answering that
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question requires that we arrive at an all-things-considered determination
of whether it is good that a parent experience guilt, where goodness
might be cashed out in terms of guilt’s instrumental utility, its meaning,
its costs to the sufferer, and so on. I will not endeavor a full-blown
account of what makes it good for one to experience some emotion
rather than not. But I will say that I think that Becca’s guilt is good, allthings-considered, for it is consistent with, and indeed it affirms, a
normative ideal of parenting: At least before her child reaches the age of
moral maturity, a parent ought to have an enlarged sense of her own
causal agency—the responsibility of raising a vulnerable, dependent
being should make it the case that parents think themselves capable of
controlling more of their child’s environment than would be reasonable
if we were assessing the extent of control one stranger ought to think he
can exercise over the environment of another. Thus, it is not a sign of
narcissistic dysfunction for a parent to see herself in her child’s acts
(though it may be when a parent continues to incorporate her child’s
agency into her own once her child reaches adulthood). It is instead the
appropriate way to understand one’s role and place in the parent-child
relationship. Thus, the parent ought to take on some of the agency that
her child lacks. And the parent ought to assess her parenting in light of
this enlarged sense of agency. Where some harm befalls her child and it
is not unreasonable for the parent to identify some salient causal
connection between the harm and her own action or inaction, guilt would
seem the proper response.
At the same time, impartial observers should see the matter
differently. Faced with the same causal indeterminacy that Becca
encounters, we bear obligations to be chary, not expansive, in our
conception of the role she played in Danny’s death. It is good that each
of us operate with a capacious sense of our own agency, but also good
that others think us not quite so powerful. Significant freedom would be
lost were others to take us to be responsible in all of the situations where
we should hold ourselves responsible.110
If that is right, then Becca can correctly judge herself to be at fault
while we can correctly judge her not to be at fault. The interesting
implication of this divergence, which we shall see in Section IV.A.2,111
is that we sometimes have reason to think Becca blameworthy even
though she is not, by our lights, at fault.
b. Fault and Relationally-Informed Guilt
In the scenario just described—where Becca reasonably concludes
that she was at fault, and so experiences guilt—the fault principle is not
110
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directly under attack. Causal indeterminacy combined with her parental
role compels Becca to conclude that she must have been at fault. That is,
her relationship serves to resolve the uncertainty around the causal facts,
and it does so in light of a norm making it appropriate to conclude that
she was at fault. But it is only in virtue of that conclusion that she takes
herself to be guilty. So, consistent with the fault principle, fault precedes
guilt; she is blameworthy only because she was at fault.
We can however begin to see the first evidence of the fissure
between blame and fault if we compare Becca’s perspective to that of the
lorry driver. Like Becca, the driver holds himself, and should hold
himself, to a standard higher than that to which bystanders do and should
hold him. Accidents seem to involve one or more counterfactuals of
indeterminate plausibility. There is always the thought that, like in
Becca’s case, greater attention, faster reflexes, something, might have
allowed one to avert disaster. And why shouldn’t the driver—or Becca—
be more afflicted by this set of thoughts than the onlooker whose agency
is not implicated in the accident?112 It is good that each of us operates
with a heightened sense of her causal agency; after all, exercising our
causal agency is not without risks.113 And it is also good that others
judge us less harshly than we judge ourselves; life would be oppressive
otherwise. By the light of his own sense of what he could and should
have done, the lorry driver has reason to feel guilt; by the light of a more
generous sense of what he could and should have done, onlookers have
reason to judge him not to be at fault.
At the same time, we might expect the magnitude of Becca’s guilt to
be greater than that of the lorry driver. Imagine two further versions of
the lorry driver case, each involving an equal, but small, quantum of
negligence. In particular, suppose that the driver in question was overdue
to have the car’s brakes checked and it was the brakes’ poor condition
that made the car unable to stop before hitting Danny.114 Now consider
two variants on this scenario: In the first, the car is driven by Williams’s
driver; in the second, it is driven by Becca. Danny, Becca’s son, is the
victim in both cases. Do Becca and the lorry driver take themselves to be
equally blameworthy? Note that both are equally at fault: While Becca
has reason to exercise heightened care when she interacts with her child,
neither Becca nor the lorry driver had any reason to think that any child,
112

David Sussman considers this possibility but he thinks it is either a species of
garden-variety remorse or, if the driver thinks the possibility of his fault exceedingly
remote, then the driver should accept blame, but not take himself to be blameworthy.
See Sussman, supra note 96, at 8–10.
113
Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 29 (“[I]t would be an insane concept of rationality
which insisted that . . . we might, if we conducted ourselves clear-headedly enough,
entirely detach ourselves from the unintentional aspects of our actions . . . and yet still
retain our identity and character as agents.”).
114
Susan Wolf developed this example. Wolf, supra note 5, at 8.

let alone hers, might dart out into the road. As such, she would not have
had reason—even from her own perspective—to have hewed to
heightened standards of care. So, she would not have reason to think that
she was more at fault, that her performance fell shorter of the mark than
the lorry driver’s. In other words, Becca and the lorry driver would hold
themselves to the same standards, and take themselves to be equally
delinquent in light of these standards. But there is a difference in the
way each views their role, for the delinquency is less tolerable in the
parent-child context than in the stranger context. As such, even though
Becca is not, and does not take herself to be, more at fault than the lorry
driver, she has reason to view her fault as more blameworthy.
This thought suggests a wedge between blame and fault. In
particular, it shows that the magnitude of warranted blame can turn on
factors additional to whether one is at fault. Again, the idea is not that
Becca is subject to more demanding standards than the lorry driver, such
that she misses the mark of what it would have been to act properly by a
greater margin than he does (i.e., that she falls shorter, so to speak, than
he does). It is instead that it is more significant when one falls short in a
way that affects a loved one, rather than a stranger, and this is true even
if one falls just as short in both cases. The fact that one has failed a loved
one thus heightens the warrant for blame on its own terms. This suggests
that the amount of blame one deserves turns in part on the extent of one’s
fault and in part on the meaning of that fault for those whom it affects; in
particular, the amount of blame two equally faulty actors deserve may
well depend on whether the victim who is harmed through their faulty
action is a stranger or a loved one, with more blame being warranted in
the latter case. So, blame is not responsive only to fault.115
Now, one might think that the fault principle could accommodate this
insight. After all, adherents of the fault principle acknowledge that where
two people are equally at fault but only one produces harm, the one who
produces harm is to blame for more than the other.116 But that
acknowledgment is not equivalent to saying that the one who produces
harm is more blameworthy than the other. Instead, on the traditional
conception, blame is calibrated solely in light of the magnitude of one’s
fault (although of course one’s “outcome responsibility”117 will depend
on the amount of harm one has caused). But the point here is that, given
equal fault and equal amounts of harm caused—a child’s death, in the
case where either Becca or the lorry driver has caused the accident—one
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agent can nonetheless warrant more blame than the other, and this
additional blame results from the relationship of the agent to the victim.
In sum, there are two ways in which relationships inform
assessments of blameworthiness. First, one’s relationship to one’s own
acts matters. Thus, Becca and the lorry driver are at fault by their own
lights, but not by ours, because they apply more demanding standards to
their own conduct than we do and should apply to it. Second, the extent
to which one is blameworthy depends on one’s relationship with the
victim, and this is a ground of blame completely independent of fault. As
such, there is some amount of blame one can deserve that has nothing to
do with how much fault one bears. We have, then, arrived at a departure
from the fault principle, even if only a modest one.
2. Faultless Guilt
Let us now return to the case as Williams had constructed it—
importantly, an accident where the lorry driver bore no fault at all, and
where the driver knows he is without fault. And let us compare the
faultless lorry driver to a faultless Becca, again with Danny as the victim,
with the important element that each driver knows that he or she is
faultless. Williams is clear that the driver’s agent-regret is fitting, but he
would also think that guilt is not. For Williams, guilt fits only if the agent
is at fault.118 So Williams is not one who rejects the fault principle; he is
just one who thinks it should be supplemented by non-moral, but no less
weighty, considerations. Williams is led to distinguish between guilt and
agent-regret precisely because of his larger project, involving a critique
of the “morality system.”119 I do not seek to intervene in that debate here,
and so I am prepared to punt on the question of whether the lorry driver’s
reaction is moral or non-moral—that is, whether we should, along with
Williams, understand the driver’s reaction as a species of agent-regret,
rather than guilt.
The important claim to be defended here is that Becca’s reaction,
even in the case where she knows she is not at fault, is a species of guilt.
Or, more accurately, Becca’s is a case where the fittingness of guilt can
elide considerations of fault altogether. A parent has killed her child.
What business does she even have investigating the facts to see if she is
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at fault? What moral difference could it make from her perspective for
the way she should feel about the death?
This is not to say that Becca’s having been at fault would make no
difference to her self-assessment. The point is rather that her attention
would be misdirected—wrongfully—if she were to worry about her
culpability. Her profound distress over having caused her son’s death
should short-circuit the typical inquiry into fault that precedes one’s
determination that one ought to experience guilt. Given her causal
agency, and given her relationship to her victim, guilt should be her lot
whether or not she is at fault.120
Another way to put the point is to say that, in this case, there is no
meaningful difference between agent-regret and guilt. For one thing, one
certainly could not rely on phenomenology to distinguish the two
reactions. I doubt that our emotional receptors are sensitive enough to
register the fine-grained differences in the way that agent-regret and guilt
will feel, especially when the reaction in question is as all-consuming as
it will be for the decent parent. But suppose that the key distinction
between guilt and agent-regret is that only the former is accompanied or
underpinned by the belief that the agent was at fault. In that case, third
parties might have a reason to characterize Becca’s felt reaction as agentregret, rather than guilt. But Becca is not, and should not be, in a position
to register this distinction—again, because it is not for her to be forming
beliefs about fault in the circumstance.121
In the variant of the case where the lorry driver or Becca bore a small
measure of fault for the car accident that killed Danny, I argued that
Becca would feel more guilt than the lorry driver, not because she was
more at fault—ex hypothese, they were equally at fault—but because the
fault was more consequential for Becca. Perhaps the set of beliefs
underpinning Becca’s greater guilt there will occur to some parents in a
situation like the horrific one that Becca faced. But we are now in a
120
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position to see that that set of beliefs is unnecessary to ground Becca’s
guilt. We need only advert to Becca’s relationship to Danny—and not to
a consideration of whether she is at fault at all—to explain why she
would and should be beset by a guilt significantly greater than the
driver’s.
This is not to say that fault must forever remain irrelevant for Becca.
As the tragedy recedes into the past, there will perhaps come a time
when it is not unseemly for Becca to contemplate whether she was at
fault in Danny’s death. Again, this inquiry will be relevant to her
assessment of her culpability. But it is not clear that any other morally
meaningful practical consequence follows.122 Will it then become
appropriate for Becca to withdraw or disavow the contrition she
displayed to her husband? To reclaim, say, the money for a scholarship
fund the couple had established in Danny’s memory? To recast her
anguish as the deeply irrational reaction of a parent in the haze of
tragedy? It seems to me like none of these responses would be
appropriate, because her initial reactions were not inappropriate. The
question of whether Becca was or was not at fault is of very minor
significance. There is a response that Becca owes simply in virtue of her
causal and relational roles: Becca should experience guilt, and she
should take herself to be blameworthy.
By way of summary, notice just how far from the fault principle we
have come: First, we have seen that one should take oneself to be
blameworthy not only in proportion to the magnitude of one’s fault, but
also in proportion to the strength of the relationship between the victim
and oneself. Thus, Becca has reason to feel more guilt if it is she, rather
than the lorry driver, who hits and kills Danny, even if neither knew that
it was Danny who darted out into the road and both were driving with
equally worn brakes. So the magnitude of warranted blame can vary in
virtue of factors other than fault. Second, in judging whether one is
blameworthy, one should operate with a sense of one’s agency
responsive to the relationship between the victim and oneself. And where
that relationship is especially central to one’s identity and one’s agency
is especially implicated in the act that prompts the judgment—as was
true in the case where Becca innocently kills Danny—the importance of
fault can recede dramatically, perhaps even to the point of irrelevance.
That is, the power of a particular relationship can provide all the warrant
for self-blame that is required.
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Imagine that, in a bid to redress her role, Becca had gone to the DMV and insisted
that they remove her driver’s license. Having now come to terms with the fact that she
was not at fault, Becca might seek to have her license reinstated. That is a practical
consequence that follows from her having assessed her culpability. But it is not a
morally meaningful one.

3. Self-Blame and Others’ Censure
This Article thus far has focused on the first-person reactions of
individuals who cause harm with little or no fault. Here, I consider
whether third parties should countenance the reactions of the first parties
or instead seek to correct them. And even if third parties conclude that
the first parties are correct in seeing things the way they do, must third
parties adopt the first parties’ perception in determining their own
reactions? To put the matter concretely, if Becca concludes that she is
liable to blame for causing Danny’s death because she is his mother, are
we then licensed in blaming her even if she is not at fault by our lights?
Even if she is not at fault even by her own lights? I address these
questions here.
To begin, I think that third parties should find it proper for Becca to
experience guilt in the three variants discussed here—minor fault,
uncertain fault, and no-fault scenarios. Given parental norms, the parent
should feel guilty in the cases under discussion. Further, the parental role
not only renders guilt appropriate from the first-person perspective that
the parent inhabits; it is also a perspective that we ought to endorse her
inhabiting. A reaction of parental guilt stemming from the parent’s
enlarged conception of her own agency constitutes and reinforces the
parent-child bond, and we have reason to value the parent-child bond. As
such, we have reason to value the features of the relationship that compel
its members to see their agencies as intertwined. We should, then,
recognize that guilt is proper for Becca, and we should allow her to
indulge it even if we do not believe her to be at fault.123
Finally, it is not just that it would be good for Becca to experience
guilt; it is also that it would be bad for her not to. Thus, for example, had
Danny’s death been caused by a reckless driver, we would think it not
only appropriate for the driver to experience guilt; we would also be
licensed in judging him badly were he not to experience it. Similarly,
since Becca’s guilt is fitting and it is proper, it is the emotion she ought
to feel in response to her role in Danny’s death,124 on pain of disapproval
by others, or at least those others who are close enough to her to express
disapproval without being taken to be meddlesome.125
Now, not everyone agrees that it would be proper to countenance
first-personal guilt if the person who judges herself guilty would not be
found to be at fault from a third-person perspective. To see this, consider
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Nancy Sherman’s searing descriptions of military commanders who lose
members of their unit in battle where, at least from a third-party’s
perspective, the soldiers’ deaths cannot be traced to any fault on the part
of the commander.126 Oftentimes a commander in this situation will
respond to these losses with profound guilt—guilt not unlike that of the
parent who loses a child. While Sherman thinks the reaction
understandable, she does not think it fitting, and so she thinks that the
commander’s loved ones ought to help him move to a more detached
perspective from which to judge himself.127 Once there, he can and
should relinquish his guilt. Williams seems to have a similar take on
whether we should countenance the lorry driver’s regret: While he
acknowledges that the driver’s regret is called for, he also contends that
others should nonetheless seek “to move the driver from this state of
feeling.”128
The problem with Sherman’s position is that it denies the meaning
of the relationship in question. For the commander to seek to move to a
more detached position is for him to betray his soldiers, and to offend
against the expectations inherent in the commander’s role. So too for
Becca to seek to move to this more detached position would be for her to
repudiate her parental role, and to do violence to the bonds of affection
that allow her to inhabit the first-person perspective in the first place.
The features of the relationship that cause the commander, or Becca, to
judge themselves blameworthy are part and parcel of what make these
relationships valuable. Neither can abandon the perspective from which
he or she judges himself or herself blameworthy without disavowing the
relationship itself. No doubt the commander or Becca would experience
far less pain if he or she were to “move on,” or “get over it.” But their
present pain is of a piece with being in the relationship; because the
relationship is itself valuable to each, each must affirm the pain it
occasions in loss too. And because these are in general valuable
relationships, we should affirm the features of the relationships that
cause this pain too.129 Thus, in the case where Becca kills Danny through
no fault of her own, we might nonetheless forbear from insisting too
126

See, e.g., NANCY SHERMAN, AFTERWAR: HEALING THE MORAL WOUNDS OF OUR
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(Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd eds., 2014) (prescribing self-empathy as an antidote to
what she deems the commanders’ “overbearing self-judgment,” id. at 191).
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WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 28. Cf. Scott A. Anderson, Rationalizing Indirect Guilt,
33 VT. L. REV. 519, 543 (2009) (stating that institutions and laws should be used for
this purpose, but to a lesser extent of trying to “assuage feelings of indirect guilt
directly”).
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Cf. Holmes, Jr., supra note 90, at 357 (drawing a connection in the history of the
doctrine of agency law between a commander’s liability for his “under-officers” and
assignment of responsibility to the head of the family for other family members’
wrongs).

heavily on her moral innocence in a bid to make her feel better. To be
sure, we shouldn’t conceal that information; it just isn’t the right note to
be hitting hard if we care about making Becca feel better. One can
imagine Becca’s responding to the plea, “but it wasn’t your fault,” with
incomprehension, as if it were no more than a non-sequitur, as it is from
her perspective. And as indeed it should be.
Should we also, then, blame Becca, as she blames herself? In other
words, is indignation, which is the emotional correlate of blame for third
parties to a wrong,130 proper for us?131 There are undoubtedly reasons to
think indignation improper, not least of all the fact that Becca is already
suffering enough. But even if, at the end of the day, we should renounce
indignation and so not blame Becca, it is nonetheless important to note
that there is a reason to blame her (though, again, a reason that gets
defeated in light of Becca’s anguish).
That reason flows from one of the functions of blame adduced in Part
III—viz., the way in which blaming allows us to enforce norms
constitutive of relationships we care about. I shall have more to say
about this when we move to cases in which grief does not so readily
outweigh the warrant for blame.132
B. Disentangling Blame and Fault in Intimate Contexts: Parental
Responsibility for Juvenile Crime
What if one’s child is not victim but instead offender? Should one
take on blame for a wrong one’s child commits on something like the
reasons that prompt Becca to take on blame for accidental harm?133
The adherent of the fault principle could answer that question in the
affirmative: After all, the thought would go, doesn’t a child’s
wrongdoing--a fortiori, his criminality--necessarily bespeak parental
delinquency?134 But that thought is mistaken. As others have noted, good
130

See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 67.
We might put the difference between whether indignation is fitting and whether it is
proper as a difference between whether the judged individual is blameworthy and
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here.
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apples sometimes give rise to bad seeds.135 The question for our purposes
is whether these good apples might nonetheless have convincing reasons
to take themselves to be blameworthy for their children’s transgressions.
My focus will thus be on those parents whose parenting practices have
been at least acceptable, perhaps even unassailable, and who nonetheless
should and sometimes do take themselves to be responsible for their
children’s crimes. I note that some states permit the prosecution and
punishment of parents whose adolescent children commit crimes, on the
presumption that the crime entails some fault on the part of parents—in
particular, inadequate supervision.136 While I ultimately conclude that it
were YOU Mother why didn’t you take care of him,” and “To me it sounds like a bad
mother.” Tragedy Compounded: Killers’ Parents Become Instant Pariahs, NBC NEWS
(July 25, 2012), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/25/12933951-tragedycompounded-killers-parents-become-instant-pariahs?lite.
135
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rush to blame parents in situations such as this one, but that is a grave mistake. Parents
do not cause mental illness, and they are not responsible for the acts of their children.”
Andrew Solomon, An Avoidable Tragedy: Aaron Alexis and Mental Illness, NEW
YORKER,
(Sept.
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2013),
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validity of parental responsibility statutes and ordinances holding parents liable for the
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Them: Why Criminal Parental Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our
Understanding of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1029, 1041–45 (1997) (discussing
different jurisdictional variances “in criminal parental responsibility laws”).
These laws are then justified because, as one commentator puts it, “parents are
largely to blame for the delinquent acts of their children.” Courtney L. Zolman,
Comment, Parental Responsibility Acts: Medicine for Ailing Families and Hope for the
Future, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 217, 219 (1998). For the view that parents should be
criminally liable only where they culpably cause their children’s crimes, see, for
example, S. Randall Humm, Comment, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a
Means to Contain Violence by and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1126
(1991).
But the notion of blanket parental culpability for crimes of their children is hardly
uncontroversial. Historically, parents could not even be held civilly liable for their
children’s acts unless they were found to have been at fault. See, e.g., James Herbie
DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1, 52 (2001) (“No
matter how heinous the behavior of the child, unless the case fit within one of the
specified exceptions [of authorization, ratification, provision of a dangerous instrument,
or negligence proximately causing child’s act], the heart of the common law rule
precluded parental liability without fault.”). But see Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental
Responsibility Laws: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1719,
1725–26 (2000) (stating that all fifty states impose vicarious tort liability on parents for
damages resulting from their children’s acts). And, indeed, resistance to visiting the
sins of children upon their parents dates back to biblical times. See Deuteronomy 24:16

would be inappropriate to prosecute faultless parents for crimes of their

(“The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put
to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin.”); George P.
Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of
Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1548 (2002) (citing a similar verse from Ezekiel).
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of one’s relationship, see Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the
Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955,
976–77, 976 n.77 (1988). For contemporary doctrinal and scholarly statements
eschewing the visitation of the sins of the father on his sons, see Amy L. Wax, The
Two-Parent Family in the Liberal State: The Case for Selective Subsidies, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 491, 525–27 (1996) (reviewing case law that refuses to treat illegitimacy as
a bar to receiving statutory entitlements that a legitimate child would receive).
For general scholarly commentary on parental responsibility laws, see Jennifer M.
Collins, Ethan J. Leib, and Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1327, 1338–43 (2009) (collecting cites on parental responsibility). The authors offer
their own critique, based on considerations of desert. See id. at 1384–89; see also Brian
Neill, Comment, A Retributivist Approach to Parental Responsibility Laws, 27 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (arguing that parents should bear criminal responsibility
for their children’s crimes only when parents have done wrong); Lisa Lockwood,
Comment, Where Are the Parents? Parental Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of
Children, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497 (2000). Other arguments against parental
responsibility laws express concern that they interfere with parental liberty, see, e.g.,
Leslie J. Harris, Making Parents Pay: Understanding Parental Responsibility Laws,
FAM. ADVOC., Winter 2009, at 38; Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations
on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their
Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 446 (1991), or will be used to go after disfavored
individuals, especially single mothers of color, see, e.g., Leslie J. Harris, An Empirical
Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending Messages, But What Kind and to
Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 10–11, 32; Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About
Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 399, 418–23. (Ironically, the issue of
teen violence seems to have garnered the appropriate level of national attention only in
cases where the killers and their victims were white. See Michael Romano, No One
Seems to Recognize Urban Violence: Minority Students See Double Standard After
Columbine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 16, 1999, at 32A, 1999 WLNR 807035.)
Courts have diverged on the constitutionality of parental responsibility laws.
Compare Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993) (upholding law over
constitutional challenge) with Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974 (Ohio Ct.
App., 2008) (overturning ordinance, even though it had permitted affirmative defense
of doing everything in one's control, because there can be no culpability without fault
under Ohio law).
For commentary on the rationale behind these laws, see, for example, DiFonzo,
supra note 136, at 6 (the “premise [of parental responsibility laws] is the empirically
unsubstantiated assumption that juvenile delinquency results primarily from improper
parental supervision”); id. at 41–49 (surveying research showing that the relationship
between parenting and child criminality is far more complex than the simple causal
story would indicate); cf. Cahn, supra note 136, at 414–15 (arguing that the laws in
question are not status-based but instead turn on the omission of a legal duty that the
parent owes his child). But see Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 136, at 1339–40
(identifying parental responsibility laws that do not require a showing of fault).

children, that issue is not my concern in this Section.137 Here I seek to
inquire into the moral emotional reactions these parents should
experience, and the reaction victims’ families, as well as impartial
parties, should have to them.
The agonizing reflections of Sue Klebold are revealing here.138 Sue
was the mother of Dylan Klebold, one of the two adolescent Columbine
killers who shot and killed thirteen people before taking their own
lives.139 Sue could not reasonably be found at fault for Dylan’s massacre.
By all accounts, Sue and Tom Klebold were model parents.140 Theirs
was described as a June and Ward Cleaver-ish household,141 and Sue
describes Dylan as “this kind, goofy kid.”142 She maintains further that
she and Tom were just as shocked as anyone else to learn that their child
could embark upon a killing spree.143 And a Colorado commission
137

I address parental criminal liability in the Conclusion. I contend that the compassion
we owe the parents of an adolescent killer will almost surely outweigh the
blameworthiness arising from the parental relationship. As such, I conclude that
criminal liability is inappropriate.
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I focus here on Sue’s reactions, and not those of Dylan’s father, only because Sue
has been much more vocal in interviews. It should not be inferred that the phenomena I
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in parental guilt and blame.
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role in his son’s murderous act, even though the father’s involvement amounted to no
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e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar & Sari Horwitz, A Year After Massacre, Family Lives ‘in
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convened to study the Columbine killings concluded that no one could
have anticipated the massacre, not even the killers’ parents.144 Finally,
the killers themselves acknowledged that their parents bore no fault. In a
video Dylan and Eric created in the days leading up to the shootings,
Dylan predicted that his parents would say something in the aftermath
like, “[i]f only we could have reached them sooner or found this tape,”145
and he insisted that they were “great parents.”146 Eric apologizes to his
parents and then goes on to exonerate them explicitly: “[t]here’s nothing
you guys could’ve done to prevent this.”147 Borrowing language from
Shakespeare, he reminds them that “[g]ood wombs hath borne bad
sons.”148
Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that Sue Klebold and
her husband were not at fault, she does not seek to disclaim. In
interviews, she unflinchingly asserts, “I was the person who had raised ‘a
monster.’”149 To be sure, she denies that she could have known of
Dylan’s plans for his schoolmates, and so she does not believe that she
could have done anything to stop him on the fateful day of his killing
spree.150 But she is nonetheless gripped by the anguishing thought that at
some level she and her husband could have done things differently and
that, had they done things differently, the Columbine massacre would
144
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never have occurred.151 Some of these what-ifs include what moral
philosophers refer to as “circumstantial luck.”152 (What if we had bought
the house in California, rather than the one in Littleton, Colorado, all
those years ago? Or, what if I had never met and married Dylan’s
father?).153 But other what-ifs contemplate steps she and her husband
might have taken that would perhaps have brought Dylan’s misery to
light, and provided him with a way of coping that would have averted the
disaster.154 This second source of anguish might be nothing other than
wishful thinking, or “resultant luck”;155 at the very least, in the case of
minimally decent parenting, onlookers would have no reason to judge
that failing to have undertaken the imagined steps constitutes fault on the
part of the Klebolds. And yet Sue is not prepared to see her lot as mere
bad luck. Instead, parental guilt is tenacious for her, just as it was for
Becca, and just as it should be. Again, parents have, and should have, an
enlarged conception of their own agency at least in part because their
children’s agency is reduced. Guilt is then fitting for Sue Klebold
because she conceives of her agency, as manifested through Dylan, in
appropriately expansive terms.
For Sue, there are two possible objects of guilt—Dylan’s killings and
his own death. Sue is unabashed about expressing her guilt over Dylan’s
suicide. She says that if she could say one last thing to Dylan, “I would
ask him to forgive me, for being his mother and never knowing what was
going on inside his head, for not being able to help him, for not being the
person he could confide in.”156
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By contrast, Sue’s guilt over Dylan’s killings is not as raw or as
readily expressed as is her anguish over Dylan and the others’ deaths.
Sue is caught in a position of dissonance: On the one hand, fighting to
preserve her conception of herself as a good parent in the face of a public
that is all too keen to blame and ostracize her,157 she has reason to insist
that she is not at fault. Dylan’s acts were committed, Sue has said, “in
contradiction to the way he was raised.”158 But notwithstanding her
efforts to cast herself as faultless with respect to the killings, her
comments sometimes betray her. Thus, for example, she states, “Dylan
was a product of my life's work, but his final actions implied that he had
never been taught the fundamentals of right and wrong. There was no
way to atone for my son's behavior.”159 Elsewhere, she puts the point
more succinctly: “We perceived his actions to be our failure.”160
Reconciling her guilt with the thought that she was a good parent
seems to require that she abandon either her guilt or her positive
assessment of her parenting. As a good parent, and consistent with the
fault principle, she dispenses with the latter. Sue feels guilt over, and
believes she is guilty for, Dylan’s killings; she has been led to believe
that guilt is appropriate only for those who are at fault; so she infers that
she must be at fault. But even as she tries desperately to figure out where
she went wrong, she comes up empty-handed.
The better way for Sue to retain both her sense of blameworthiness
and her belief in her good parenting is for her to recognize that hers is a
case where the fault principle does not obtain. Sue is blameworthy
simply because she is Dylan’s parent. The buck must stop with her. (So
too for Dylan’s father.) She shares ownership of Dylan’s acts with Dylan
simply in light of the enlarged sense of agency that, as we saw with
Becca, parenting entails.161 And it is because Dylan’s acts are in some
STYLE (Nov. 14, 2012), https://ca.style.yahoo.com/blogs/parenting/columbine-shooterdylan-klebold-8217-parents-speak-191300537.html.
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up. My son was in the library doing what he was supposed to do.” Id.
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David Enoch argues that a parent has a moral obligation to take responsibility and, if
she does, she then becomes responsible for her son’s act. But if she declines to take
responsibility, he continues, she is off the hook for her child’s murders, although not
completely in the clear, because she remains culpable for breaching her obligation to
take responsibility. See Enoch, supra note 17, at 102–03, 107. I think it problematic that
Enoch’s account leaves it to the parent to choose whether she will be blameworthy for
her child’s wrong or instead for failing to take responsibility for her child’s wrong. For

sense hers, and not because she was a bad parent (again, she was not)
that Sue should take herself to be blameworthy.
In short, guilt is fitting for Sue not because she was at fault but
simply because, as Dylan’s mother, she should see herself as implicated
in his killings. Is Sue’s guilt proper? Is it the emotion she should
experience, all things considered? Having found Becca’s guilt proper,
there is no reason not to arrive at the same conclusion for Sue. In
Becca’s case, we saw that grief was not a counterweight to guilt; instead,
both arose from the same bonds. Here the same is true, and there is more
for which Sue can feel guilty. But if it is fitting and proper for Sue to feel
guilty, and so to take herself to be blameworthy, what does that entail for
the way we should think about her?
We have no reason to take Sue to be at fault. We should nonetheless
acknowledge that it is fitting and proper for Sue to feel guilt, in light of
the same considerations that underpin Sue’s guilt—namely, that this is
the appropriate way to express the significance of her relationship with
Dylan.162 As such, we should not try to encourage Sue to overcome her
one thing, the account thus has the implausible consequence of making all failures to
take responsibility equally culpable, independent of the egregiousness of the act for
which one declines to take responsibility. Thus, his account overlooks any reason we
might have to think the parent’s failure to take responsibility for her son’s killing worse
than her failure to take responsibility, say, for her son’s elbowing an opponent in
basketball.
Further, I believe that Enoch mischaracterizes the nature of the wrong involved in
failing to take responsibility for the wrongs of one’s child. He writes:
[T]he mere fact that these are actions of your children does not
suffice for your being responsible. But if you do not incorporate them
into your agency by taking responsibility for them, you are not
thinking of yourself as a parent (in the normatively rich way needed
here). And—being a parent—you should think of yourself as a parent.
Id. at 126. In this way, the central wrong in declining to take responsibility, as Enoch
sees it, seems to amount to no more than a failure of authenticity, or a failure to be true
to what parenting requires. It is as if one were to reproach the parent who willfully
starves her child to death for failing to live up to the standards of minimally decent
parenting, but not for having caused the child’s death by starvation. Putting the point
that way might do no more than underscore the difference between Enoch’s account
and mine—namely, that he thinks the parent is not responsible until she takes
responsibility, whereas I think of her responsibility as something that is already hers for
the taking. But that is because I think the proper way to honor the parent-child
relationship is not simply to reproach the parent who disclaims but also to impose upon
her the responsibility she fails to take on herself. I make the case for imposing
relationally-based responsibility on one who shirks it when I turn to the example of the
CEO. See infra note 177.
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Enoch and I are closer on this point. He writes: “without the power—and sometimes
also the duty—to take responsibility for one’s children’s actions, the nature of
parenthood would have been significantly different, and not, it seems to me, for the
better.” Enoch, supra note 161, at 124.

guilt, as we would in the case of someone who had unreasonably taken
on blame. Further, there is a reason for us to blame Sue: among other
possible goods, blaming Sue affirms the good of the parent-child bond.
But, importantly, that reason is defeasible. Whether we should all things
considered, blame Sue will turn, as it did with Becca, on a calculus about
how the good of blame here fares against whatever reasons we have to
withhold blame—compassion, in particular.163 I do not endeavor to work
out which way the scales should tip at the end of the day, for Sue or for
other parents of adolescent killers. The important point is that there is
warrant for blaming Sue independent of her being at fault. Extending the
analysis, we can see that it is at least theoretically possible that the
reason to blame the faultless parent of an adolescent killer will outweigh
the reason we have to withhold blame. For example, if the killer survives
his massacre and if his parents fail to demonstrate remorse, we might
enforce the norm of taking on blame for the wrong of one’s child by
imposing upon the parents the blame they have so far refused to
shoulder. And we would do this by blaming them.
With that said, one might still wonder why censure is the appropriate
way to affirm the parental bond. In response, I note that the claim here is
not that censure is the only way to affirm the parental bond, just as guilt
is not the only response appropriate for the parent of the adolescent
murderer. In addition to guilt, the parent should adopt the perhaps heroic
stance of persisting in her love and support for her child notwithstanding
his monstrous acts. And she should display loyalty to her child; she
should zealously voice any considerations that might mitigate his guilt.
Each of these responses is appropriate in the circumstance as each
expresses the proper appreciation of the values at issue. For that reason,
we should support the parent in all of this. We should recognize the
propriety in her responses if she offers them, and apply normative
pressure if she does not. And, again, we should blame her if the
countervailing reasons for withholding blame do not rule it out.164
Still, one might wonder why blame should even be a candidate
response among the options we have. Blame’s connection to bloodlust
might cause the more compassionate among us to recoil from the notion
of heaping blame upon a parent as bewildered and broken-hearted as Sue
Klebold.165 Surely there are more productive responses. Columbine itself
provides an example: the school library, where a majority of the students
were killed, was walled off in the aftermath of the shootings, and parents
engaged in an effort to raise funds to build a new library—one that
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would not loom as so bloody a reminder of the massacre.166 Should the
Klebolds and Harrises have sought to take part in this effort, perhaps
even donating more than any other family? Why wouldn’t that have been
a more appropriate way for them to take responsibility? Why need they
instead hold themselves out as targets of blame?
The answer to these questions is something like the thought that
arose in response to the lorry driver who took himself to be no
differently situated from an onlooker.167 The lorry driver killed the child,
however innocently, whereas the onlooker did not. That he did so
changes the “normative landscape” for him.168 He can come to owe
duties of apology and repair to the victim’s family that a mere bystander
does not owe. Moreover, this would be true even if his own child, sitting
in the cab next to him, died as a result of the accident as well. His loss,
that is, would not undercut the fact of his obligations to the victim’s
family.
By the same token, the Klebolds’ loss does not put them in the same
boat as the other grieving parents. They owe something in virtue of their
relationship to the killer. Other cases involving adolescent killers bear
this out. For example, it is not uncommon for the parents of these killers
to experience remorse. Thus, statements released by the parents of James
Cho, the Virginia Tech killer, and Jared Loughner, the man who shot
Gabrielle Giffords, each express contrition for their son’s acts.169 In a
similar vein, Peter Lanza, estranged father of Sandy Hook killer, Adam
Lanza, was described as “wracked by guilt, confusion[,] and grief” a year
after his son’s massacre.170 Further, many families in this situation try to
make amends. For example, Peter Rodger, whose son, Elliot Rodger,
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shot and killed six people in Santa Barbara, developed “a small website
with resources on mental illness and a place to share stories” in an effort
to help families identify and address mental illness in one of their loved
ones.171 In 2016, Sue Klebold published a memoir of her experience of
the Columbine massacre, and she directed all proceeds from the book to
charities focusing on mental health issues.172 All of this suggests that,
even when these parents lose their own child as a result of his killings,
they do not conceive of themselves as mere victims. Instead, they take on
some responsibility for their children’s crimes. The foregoing has
endeavored to explain why they are right to have done so.
C. Blame and Fault for Corporate Wrongs
We have been surveying cases involving intimates, and governed by
the messy and sometimes discordant norms that reign in the intimate
sphere. I turn now to what may seem a quite different context—that of
the corporation—to determine how the dynamics already described
might play out there.
Suppose that a corporation has committed a crime—for example, in
one of its many factory plants, the foreman has failed to supply workers
with adequate safety gear that he knows they need, and one of them has
died as a result. The corporation is convicted of involuntary
manslaughter,173 and it is time to assign responsibility for the crime to
the corporation’s members. The crime’s individual perpetrators are, of
course, the most likely and deserving candidates. But perhaps others in
the corporation deserve blame too.174 Consider here the responsibility of
the CEO, for he is situated most similarly to the parent or the military
commander whom we have already contemplated: Like each of these
other characters, the CEO has a reason to see his agency as overlapping
with the agency of those with whom he is in a particular relationship—in
his case, with those in his employ—as regards the acts they undertake in
the course of their employment. The cause of the overlap is not, of
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course, the moral immaturity of his subordinates, as it is for the parent; it
is instead the fact that he, in a sense similar to the commander, guides
what his employees do while they are on the job. This is not to suggest
that he authorizes, or indeed that he is even aware of, their day-to-day
activities. Nonetheless, they act under his authority—he could explicitly
alter their activities if he so chose, and they act to carry out a vision and
mission for the corporation of which he is, during his tenure as CEO,
principal author.175
Now, none of that establishes anything more than a tenuous causal
connection between the CEO and his employee’s acts. And this tenuous
connection may be all that we, outsiders to the corporation, can discern
about the CEO’s role in the crime, given the complex network of
interactions within the corporate web. But suppose we could see just
what the nature of the relationship was between what the CEO had done
(or not done) and the crime that was committed. We would then have
learned something useful about the responsibility he bears qua individual
(was he a perpetrator? facilitator? authorizer? etc.). But, importantly, we
would not have learned anything useful about the responsibility he bears
qua chief officer of the corporation. Indeed, to treat him as he deserves
in virtue of his role in this context is to refrain from seeking to arrive at
an individualized assessment of his responsibility.
Group membership is valuable; participating with others in a shared
endeavor, under the aegis of an entity that subsumes the identities of
each individual into a unified whole, provides value and meaning. This
kind of group experience requires members to recognize that the group
acts on their behalf; that its acts are theirs. Corporations are one such
group, at least for a core set of members who are positioned to form or
inform the group’s identity—executives in particular.
The CEO, like the parent or military commander, ought to act with
an enlarged conception of his agency, such that he sees those acts of his
employees that are attributable to the corporation as his own. This
enlargement of agency flows from the authority he enjoys over his
employees. But there is a second reason for him to conceive of his
agency in expanded terms, and it is one that applies to all group members
who are expected to harbor a commitment to the corporation. These
members ought to view themselves in the corporation’s acts because
doing so affirms the solidarity and loyalty that makes group membership,
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including membership in a corporation, valuable.176 And if all this is true
of the generic group member, it should hold even more so for the leader
of a group, like the CEO, from whom the expected commitment to the
shared project is probably strongest.177
Further, given the value in these relationships, we have reason to
honor them. In this case, that means viewing the CEO qua group
member, rather than judging him as an isolated individual, on the basis
of what he himself did or did not do. We should affirm the CEO’s
forsaking his entitlement to an individual assessment, and we should do
so by going along with it—by judging him alongside his fellows. So it is
that we may praise or blame the CEO in virtue of what the corporation
has done, and without regard to what he has or has not done.
Of course, all of this presumes that the CEO willingly accepts blame,
and we defer to his judgment as a matter of aligning ourselves with the
values that prompt him to do so. But the CEO might not do what he
ought. What then?
This is a situation where it is perfectly appropriate to enforce his
obligation to take on blame, and to do so by blaming him. Here, unlike in
the family contexts already discussed, we need not worry about overstepping intimate boundaries. Moreover, we do not occupy the stance of
mere disinterested observers. The CEO owes it to his fellow members to
accept blame; by doing so he affirms his conception of the corporation as
a team, whose members stand or fall together. But his fellow members
are not the ones with a grievance—instead, the family members of the
victim are the ones most immediately in need of the CEO’s taking on
blame. And, as with other cases in which a grave wrong has been
committed, the community at large is entitled to hold those responsible
for it to account.178 It is then not only that the CEO ought to take on
blame; it is that he owes it to us to do so. This changes our position visà-vis enforcing his obligation.
Will our blaming him be effective in putting him in the position he
should occupy, and would have occupied had he recognized that he was
blameworthy? I think it will. In refusing to take on blame, the CEO has
more than he deserves, and we, as those whom the corporation’s crime
has offended, have less. Enforcing his obligation to take on blame by
blaming him thus has three positive effects for us. First, it entails that he
loses some moral credit. Second, blaming him entails that we have our
injury (that of the offense against our shared moral prohibitions, if not
also our criminal laws) recognized. Finally, blaming the CEO gives us an
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opportunity to affirm the importance of the bonds of solidarity that ought
to have compelled the CEO to take on blame in the first place.
In short, given that the CEO ought to see himself in the acts of his
employees carried out in the scope of the business, he ought to take
himself to be blameworthy for the crime they carried out on the
corporation’s behalf. And given that the norms underpinning his taking
on blame are ones we have reason to value, we should take his
blameworthiness at his word. Or, if he shirks the blame he should
shoulder, we should blame him nonetheless (or, better still, all the more).
Further, the CEO’s judgment should elide considerations of fault
altogether. In taking himself to be blameworthy, the CEO does not adopt
the belief, or even commit himself to coming to adopt the belief, that he
is at fault. The situation is unlike the Becca variant who, faced with the
question of whether she could have prevented Danny’s death, errs on the
side of treating her agency expansively, not because the evidence points
clearly in that direction but because, for a parent, that is the correct
direction in which to err. Becca thus chooses to believe that she is at
fault. But the CEO’s taking on blame should not be a matter of choice in
this way; it should not be responsive to facts that go to the CEO’s
contribution to the crime. Instead, as CEO, he should automatically take
himself to be blameworthy, even if he could not have done anything to
prevent the corporation’s crime. He is situated differently from Becca
because he represents a group, and the stance of solidarity he owes to the
other group members entails that he should take on responsibility
independent of his fault. The crime is his regardless. When it comes to
the acts of those with whom he shares agency, the buck stops with him.
This is not to suggest that whether the CEO contributed wrongly to
the corporation’s crime is of no moment. To the contrary, facts about his
personal culpability are deeply relevant to an inquiry into the blame he
deserves qua individual. If he is personally culpable, so much the worse
for our assessment of him.179 And he should seek to assess his own
culpability, as a matter of seeking to prevent a like crime in the future.
But the important point for present purposes is that independent of (or
over and above) whatever blame he deserves in light of his own
wrongdoing, the CEO must take himself to deserve blame for the
corporation’s crimes because he must see that his agency is reflected in
the corporation’s acts, and he must see this not because he wrongly
contributed to the corporation’s crime but just because his seeing this is
what the norms and obligations of his role require. It is in this way that
the CEO is blameworthy independent of whether he is at fault.
Much of this might seem foreign, perhaps given the ease with which
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corporate CEOs apologize on behalf of their corporations while carefully
avoiding statements suggesting that they themselves are guilty.180 But it
is a commonplace in other cultures, captured most notably, perhaps, in
the Japanese ritual of shintai ukagai, in which corporate officials bow in
apology, and sometimes even submit letters of resignation, in response to
corporate wrongdoing, independent of their participation in that
wrongdoing.181 The foregoing makes clear the moral stance
underpinning the recognition that one owes an apology for the crime of
one’s corporation, and it allows us to see the good in that stance.
D. The Tenacity of Fault
In all of these examples, the temptation to shoehorn the facts such
that they fit within the bounds of the fault principle is tantalizing,
perhaps even inescapable. One way to do so involves adopting an ever
more expansive conception of fault. Thus, an adherent of the fault
principle might agree that the occupant of certain relationships or roles,
like the CEO, or parent, or military commander, is subject to morestringent-than-normal standards. But he will then argue that the
corporation’s (or the child’s or one’s soldiers’) wrong just is evidence
that the CEO (or the parent or commander) must have fallen short of
these standards. Further, his having fallen short just is what constitutes
his fault. He is blameworthy, but blameworthy in just the way the
garden-variety wrongdoer is—because he is at fault.
Before addressing this effort to resist the idea of faultless liability to
blame, I note its polar opposite, which is nonetheless its soul sister—
namely, the claim that none of the characters under discussion is in fact
blameworthy or at fault: on this line of argument, the characters suffer
from a kind of neuroticism. All of them might think themselves subject
to peculiarly high standards that they have failed to meet, but we have no
reason to affirm these enhanced standards, and so no reason to think
these characters either at fault or to blame.
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These twin efforts to escape the notion of faultless blame—again, the
first recasting fault so that it applies to the protagonists in the scenarios
here and the second diagnosing our protagonists with a paranoia that
falsifies their judgments of blame—reflect the remarkable tenacity of the
fault principle. The first strategy sees fault as so essential to warranted
blame that it stretches the notion of fault beyond recognition. And yet the
devotee of the fault principle who is willing to stretch the notion of fault
this far has essentially adopted the view I have articulated, albeit without
abandoning the terminology of the traditional account. Still, I doubt that
most adherents of the fault principle would so readily agree that fault is
as broad as it must be in order to find it within the scenarios examined
here.
The critic who denies that there is fault in these scenarios and instead
sees only neuroticism is not so easily appeased. It is not clear what more
can be said to convince this critic that Becca, Sue, the military
commander, the CEO, and so on are not merely self-aggrandizing
narcissists who take on responsibility that is not in fact theirs. I have
endeavored to show that their judgments of blame constitute appropriate
responses given the norms and values that underpin the relationships in
which they happen to find themselves. The critic who disagrees cannot
dismiss these cases simply by assigning a psychological pathology to one
who would judge themselves as Becca, the CEO, and the others should.
This critic must instead take on the conception of the relationships and
their governing norms that I have advanced, and demonstrate that these
are in some way mistaken. If nothing else, then, the argument here
should at least shift the burden of persuasion to the person who would
deny that, at least in the cases under discussion, one can be blameworthy
even without fault. It is perhaps not overly modest to content oneself
with having done no more than burden shifting when the burden one has
shifted lay so entirely on one’s side at the outset.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing has involved an extended inquiry into whether fault
and blame can come apart. I have endeavored to show that they can and
do. This leaves us with four characters (Becca, Sue, the commander, and
the CEO) who are blameworthy even though none of them would be
deemed at fault under the fault principle. Of course, the fault principle is
not first and foremost a principle about just blame; it is instead a
principle about just punishment. Which if any of the four characters
should we look to punish?
The answer, I believe, is straightforward albeit anticlimactic for that
very reason. As the fault principle says, we should punish only those
who are blameworthy. I have shown how each of the protagonists here

can be blameworthy. But being blameworthy is but a necessary condition
for being appropriately subject to punishment. Having seen that this
necessary condition can be satisfied in the cases involving our four
characters, we must then turn to the other considerations that govern
whether some blameworthy species of conduct ought to receive the
response of the criminal law. There is nothing unique to be said here,
notwithstanding the fact that the genesis of the warrant for blame lies
partly or entirely outside of the realm of fault. Instead, whether or not
blame should result in criminal liability in these cases is determined by
whatever garden variety considerations we bring to bear in determining
the scope of the criminal law more generally—by assessing the
magnitude of harm involved, the effectiveness of addressing this harm
through criminalization,182 application of other rationales for
punishment, the implications for individual liberty of criminalization,
and so on.
I do not undertake to work out these considerations here, but I will
venture my best guesses as to the results: I think it unsurprising that we
are loath to enforce the norms of parenting through criminal law, at least
where we outsiders have no reason to think that parents are at fault. We
view these spheres as intimate spaces, we are right to do so, and so
government intervention would both be unwelcome and perhaps also
ineffective, because the meaning of the bonds we seek to enforce would
be undercut through the enforcement.
But these considerations might well go the other way when it comes
to executive criminal liability. The wrongs for which CEOs ought to
accept blame sometimes involve massive harm—one need only look at
the acts of fraud that partly precipitated the financial crisis to see this.183
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Prosecuting and punishing CEOs would have undeniable deterrent
effects.184 Relative to punishing the corporation itself, which, famously
has “no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked,”185 punishing the
CEO would provide a far more meaningful and satisfying target for the
anger that the corporate crime has elicited. And liberty considerations
would not decisively cut against criminal liability, especially because
CEO convictions need not entail jail time, and especially given that
CEOs are already subject to civil sanctions for many of the offenses for
which they would be prosecuted under the account I have advanced. All
of this to say that these considerations amount to at least a colorable
argument in favor of punishing CEOs who are to blame without fault.
As a society, we have not explored these considerations in thinking
about the response to corporate crime because we have taken the fault
principle to act as a side-constraint on the permissibility of punishment.
But one way to understand the efforts here would be to see them as an
argument in favor of replacing the fault principle with what might be
called the blame principle. Like the fault principle, the blame principle
would stand as a side-constraint on permissible punishment. But it would
hold not that one may be punished only if one is at fault but instead that
one may be punished only if one is to blame. One can be to blame (i.e.,
blameworthy) even if one is not at fault. A CEO, in particular, can be to
blame even if he is not at fault. And if he is, and if other considerations
militate in favor of our responding to him through the criminal law, then
we would do him no injustice by punishing him, and we would do much
justice for everyone else as a result.
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